Christian Rosser

**Papers on the Transatlantic Transfer of Administrative Ideas in the 20th Century − What American Scholars of Public Administration Learned from the Germans**

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With a foreword by Fritz Sager

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## Foreword

Fritz Sager

This issue of the *KPM-Schriftenreihe* contains four articles which form Christian Rosser's dissertation. With his contribution, he has earned the degree of a *Doctor rerum socialium* at the Faculty of Business, Economics, and Social Sciences of the University of Bern with Insigni cum laude.

Rosser's dissertation sprouted from a larger research project dealing with the question of how the German, French, and US-American administrative sciences of the 20th century mutually influenced each other. Thus far, the transatlantic transfer of administrative ideas has not been analyzed in a systematic manner. In general, comparative Public Administration concentrates on differences rather than similarities which are the result of mutual perceptions and fertilizations among Continental European and US-American scholars. Accordingly, the research traditions in the three countries have usually been interpreted as separated 'paths'. It is the project's main hypothesis that these 'paths' have had significant 'road junctions' and that this lack of knowledge constitutes a major research gap.

In the following four articles, Rosser concentrates on the reception of Hegelian and Weberian administrative ideas in the American literature. First, he has substantially contributed to developing and formulating an analytical framework which promises to analyze the transfer of administrative ideas. This research has resulted in the publication of the article "*How Traditional Are the American, French and German Traditions of Public Administration? A Research Agenda*".

Second, Rosser has analyzed the similarities between Wilson, Weber and Hegel's administrative concepts, focusing on both the side of the 'receiver' and the side of the 'sender'. This research has resulted in the publication of the article "*Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy*".

Third, Rosser has concentrated on examining an example of reception, namely Wilson's adoption and modification of German state theory. This research has resulted in the publication of "*Woodrow Wilson's Administrative Thought and German Political Theory*".

Finally, Rosser has focused on the side of the 'sender' by analyzing Weber's reception in American Public Administration. In the study "*Weber Reloaded: How Was Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy Received in the Organizational and the Political*

*Approach to U.S. Public Administration?*", Rosser provides a quantitative overview of the transfer of Weberian ideas as mirrored in both literature which approaches public administration from a political science perspective and organization theory. On the basis of a qualitative textual analysis, he then discusses and compares these two receptions.

It has to be highlighted that the first three articles have already been published in top journals in the field of Public Administration. In addition, the paper on Weber's, Wilson's, and Hegel's theories of modern bureaucracy received the *Marshall Dimock Award* for the best lead article of the *Public Administration Review* in the volume year 2009 − an exceptional accomplishment for a doctoral student.

Overall, Rosser presents a very thorough empirical analysis of the transatlantic transfer of ideas by looking at two of the most important scholars of early 20th century Public Administration - one on each side of the Atlantic. As Rosser's interest does not lie with the two analyzed authors per se, but with how they were influenced by others (in the case of Woodrow Wilson) or influencing others (in the case of Max Weber), he cannot contend himself with the respective writings of the two.

Methodologically, all papers draw on the research design developed in the first paper. The actual empirical work is impressive. In the paper on Wilson's German intellectual background, Rosser covers the full body of Wilson's writings on Public Administration as well as the core works of von Stein and Bluntschli. In the Weber paper, he presents no less than the analysis of 99 textbooks, in 47 of which Weber was cited at various points. All these books as well as Weber's relevant writings had to be examined in depth.

Rosser displays great detail mastery of his subject. His familiarity with his empirical material enables him to gain new insights as to his research questions. For instance, he can clarify Wilson's somewhat unclear stance towards the politics-administration dichotomy by showing that Wilson followed German proponents of organic state theory and saw a political role of administration. In the paper on Weber's reception among American administrative scholars, Rosser makes the important point that the (mis)interpretation of Weber as a promoter of administrative efficiency may not have been that big a mistake after all and that many American authors may have had a more adequate understanding of Weber than often is assumed. Moreover, Rosser shows how reinterpretations of Weber's writings led to fruitful developments of post-war U.S. Public Administration.

Rosser's research does not only satisfy a historical interest. His findings also have direct relevance for current administrative science that refers to both Wilson (in the case of the neo-progressives) as well as to Weber (e.g., in the case of the neo-Weberian state concept). All these points speak for the great value and quality of Rosser's work. To conclude, Rosser presents an outstanding analysis of the trans-atlantic transfer of ideas based on diligent and accurate textual analyses. His re-search provides important methodological and theoretical implications for the further development of the contemporary comparative study of public administration.

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Christian Rosser

# How Traditional Are the American, French and German Traditions of Public Administration? A Research Agenda[1]

Fritz Sager, Christian Rosser, Pascal Y. Hurni and Céline Mavrot

*Consistent with the notion of tradition, public administration scholars usually interpret and compare administrative developments in the US, France, and Germany as inheritance, assuming continuity. However, administrative traditions have thus far not been an object of systematic research. The present research agenda aims to address this research gap by introducing the transfer-of-ideas approach as a means to examine the empirical substance of national traditions. We claim that for current research, the benefits of this approach are twofold. First, the transfer-of-ideas approach contributes to comparative public administration since it reveals in how far intellectual traditions are hybrid instead of distinctively American, French or German developments. Second, the approach may help to address the polysemous meanings of and terminological difficulties within administrative concepts that prevail in Public Administration on both sides of the Atlantic.*

## Introduction

Whereas the lion's share of comparative research on American and Continental European public administration has focused on the administrative practice (public administration, with lower case 'p' and 'a') (see, for example, Heady 2003), some studies have also compared public administration on both continents as it evolved in theory (Public Administration, upper case 'P' and 'A') (see, for example, Kickert and Stillman 1999; Rutgers 2001; Bevir *et al.* 2003). These studies usually approach the comparative history of ideas of Public Administration against the background of intellectual traditions, regarding traditions as ideal typical constructs, path dependencies, or cultural variations on a macro level (Painter and Peters 2010, pp. 4-5). While intellectual traditions are highly useful as conceptual maps, it is debatable to what degree such schematic models are empirically valid. It is the intention of this paper to introduce the transfer-of-ideas approach - an approach that is able to deal analytically with the empirical substance of intellectual traditions as self-referential path dependencies within comparative Public Administration.

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In their book on *Tradition and Public Administration*, Painter and Peters (2010, p. 19; see also Kickert and Stillman 1999, p. 6) identify four sub-traditions or, to put it in their own words, four 'discrete families comprising groups of countries within the Western cultural tradition', each sharing a similar intellectual inheritance: the Anglo-American, the Napoleonic, the Germanic, and the Scandinavian. With regard to the first three intellectual traditions, in the sense of a most different case scenario, the research agenda concentrates on the US, France and Germany. According to Painter and Peters (2010, p. 20), the manifestation of the Anglo-American tradition 'is taken to its greatest extreme in the United States'. With regard to the Napoleonic and the Germanic tradition, the same can arguably be said about France and Germany respectively (Painter and Peters 2010, pp. 21-2). Owing to lack of proficiency in the relevant languages, we unfortunately have to exclude the Scandinavian tradition from the discussion. Hence, to present empirical evidence in support of or against the notion of distinct intellectual traditions, we intend to examine the transfer of ideas among American, French, and German Public Administration scholars of the 20th century. As we aim to capture the empirical substance of intellectual traditions as self-referential path dependencies, the transfer-of-ideas approach focuses on paradigms as units of investigation rather than on techniques that are applied specifically in administrative practice.

The paper has five sections. First, we discuss how the concept of intellectual traditions has been used in comparative Public Administration. Second, we recapitulate the state of the art on the transfer of administrative ideas among American, French, and German scholars of the 20th century. The discussion of existing research will show that even though there has been considerable intellectual interaction, the transfer of administrative ideas has not been analysed in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The two subsequent sections discuss the analytical framework of the transfer-of-ideas approach with which this research gap may be filled. As regards theory, we propose a model that is capable of accounting for the empirical substance of intellectual traditions. As regards method, we outline a content analysis that enables us to select, structure, and examine the body of sources. In the concluding section we discuss in how far contemporary Public Administration scholarship may profit from a comprehensive analysis of the transatlantic transfer of administrative ideas.

## The Administrative Traditions of the US, France and Germany

If the history of US administrative thought is conceived of as a path dependent, incremental development, the American tradition of thinking about public administration can be interpreted as a statelessness narration. This stands in contrast to the Continental European narration, where the state has always been the centre of gravity (Stillman 1997; Kickert and Stillman 1999; Rutgers 2001; Stillman 2001). In what follows, we recapitulate how this notion of tradition has been used in the literature, first by looking at the example of the US, and then at the cases of Germany and France.

Stillman (2003, p. 19) states that 'at the heart of the American political tradition, antistatism endures as the core belief that is evidenced over and over again during the past four centuries of American political life'. In the liberal tradition of social compact theories following the likes of Montesquieu and Locke (Lutz 1984), government has been conceptualized around fundamental and inalienable rights such as equality, property, and individual liberty. The protection of these constitutional principles continues to be understood as the main reason for political organization in the US. According to Spicer (2004, p. 356), this form of organization may be labelled as a civil association 'in which men and women see themselves as free to pursue their own particular interests and values. What binds them together as a political group is not any common set of substantive ends or objectives, but their common recognition or acknowledgement of certain rules of conduct'. Hence, the government is interpreted 'more like an umpire than a manager' and public administration is clearly not conceived as the guardian of the public interest (Spicer 2004, p. 357). Kickert (2001, p. 28) maintains that 'bureaucrat bashing is a most popular sport in the States'.

Not only has the mainstream of US intellectuals disapproved of a powerful federal state, but also of an influential public administration. On the federal level, administration is primarily linked to the executive and the lion's share of public responsibility is assigned to elected representatives (Rutgers 2001, pp. 230-1). Other than that, local self-government and a well attuned (inter)active relationship between citizens and the political institutions are considered to correspond with the societal needs. In his article on the usefulness of administrative traditions, Raadschelders (2007, pp. 3-4) illustrates how the American way of dealing with social conflicts is

sometimes called 'the "village model" where conflict is resolved by considering the specific situation at hand'.

With regard to the training of Public Administration scholars, US universities have focused on the education of social scientists and managers rather than lawyers. Administrative knowledge has generally been acquired on the basis of methodological individualism. US scholars give priority to individuals or interest groups and stress governance - instead of government - as the core concept of their endeavor. As practitioners rather than theoreticians, intellectuals tend to induce administrative subject-matters from the relevant praxis. It is the empirical context that constitutes administrative principles and not vice versa as in Continental Europe (Stillman 1997). In addition, American scholars often lay their focus on prescriptive studies because it is administrative science which tells the critically perceived state what to do and, maybe more importantly, what not to do. Finally, Public Administration in the US has traditionally favoured a non-historical approach (see, for example, Stillman 1997, p. 335; Spicer 2004, p. 359).

According to Painter and Peters (2010, p. 6), 'the alternative to the contractarian notion of the state is a more organic view, in which state and society are intertwined to the extent that it is almost impossible to separate them. [...] Continental political systems such as Germany and France have the clearest organic conception of the state'. We may thus label both the French and the German form of political organization - again in Spicer's (2004, p. 355) terminology - as purposive association 'in which individuals recognize themselves as united or bound together for the joint pursuit of some coherent set of substantive purposes or ends'. French and German citizens habitually expect the state to play an active role in the resolution of social conflicts. Stillman (1997, p. 334; see also Raadschelders and Rutgers 1999) notes that in Continental Europe, the state 'was the centrepiece around which most conflicts were fought, from the Renaissance and Reformation through the twentieth century. The concept of the state also defined the political thought of those centuries'.

Chevallier (1996, p. 67) holds that the 'French strong state tradition decisively shapes both its past and present development of public administration'. In the early 19th century, practice-oriented work of French authors was linked with the development of the monarchic state and the centralization of administration. Later, the emergence of the liberal state induced the monopoly of the juridical approach. The question of the legal framing of state activity obtained priority, and the knowledge

on public administration increasingly became the prerogative of the law faculties and the *Conseil d'Etat*. This anchorage of administrative law in the rule of law involved a focalization on the specificities of public administration. After the Second World War, however, several reform movements gave birth to a renewal of administrative sciences. Thus, since the 1960s, French administrative science has fluctuated between three models, emphasizing either legal, managerial or sociological dimensions. These models generally identify the state as the administration's centre of gravity (Chevallier 1996).

In the second half of the 19th century, the scholarly treatment of public administration in Germany also became dominated by jurisprudence. According to Seibel (1996, p. 75), the 'relatively rigid legal structure that was the backbone of public administration turned out to be a desirable counterweight to the volatility of the political structure in 20th century Germany'. While the dominance of lawyers in academia and in public administration prevailed, Scharpf (1970) criticized the *Rechtsstaat* as too rigid and inflexible to respond to the emerging societal and political changes, and thus challenged the organizational structure of bureaucracy. Not until the 1970s was it possible for Public Administration to develop as an academic field, first within political science and then as an increasingly distinct discipline. Even though the perception of the state has shifted 'from democratic via active and lean to the activating state, […] Germany is to a large extent still a heavily state-based society, and the dispute about the proper role and understanding of the state lies at the heart of much of the current debate' (Jann 2003, p. 96).

Despite the dissimilarities in their respective developments, France and Germany share common grounds in the conception of the state. For example, besides being an institution, the state is considered to be the normative frame encompassing the various estates and the trustee of the general interest. Additionally, scholars from both countries attribute a distinct legitimacy to the state itself, for it is perceived as standing above any particular group of society (Benz 2001, p. 39). The basic idea among intellectuals is that the state has always existed a priori and that the bureaucratic apparatus has grown in close correspondence with the state. This may be a reason why French and German scholars have often put emphasis on the historical evolution and modernization of the bureaucratic apparatus. The state is usually interpreted as apolitical, noneconomic, and non-utilitarian in character as well as dependent on the sovereignty of the people. Both the French and German public administrations, which are conventionally referred to as the working state, are iden-

tified as largely independent of politics. This explains the relevance of public administration for the development of the state and the implementation of the public good. Public servants have therefore often been regarded as 'legitimate guardians of the public interest' (Rutgers 2001, p. 228).

The high importance of jurisprudence within French and German Public Administration may explain why the concrete administrative praxis has generally been deduced from theoretical principles. Overall, the features of Public Administrations in Germany and France have led to a scientific discipline which derives administrative principles from state principles in general and law principles in particular (Seibel 1996, p. 75; Stillman 1997, p. 335; Jann 2003, pp. 98-9; Rutgers 2003, pp. 244-50). As a consequence, the European focus is primarily on analytical studies, on bureaucratic theory as well as on the description of facts.

If we approach the history of administrative ideas with the notion of intellectual traditions, we risk implying that in Continental Europe and in the United States public administration research has always followed distinct incremental paths. With regard to the unifying effect of globalization and the influence of New Public Management (NPM) in Western academe (Lynn 2006), most scholars would certainly reject this generalization. Moreover, Painter and Peters (2010, p. 139) hold that hybridity in administrative traditions appears to be the rule rather than the exception. However, as Raadschelders (2007) claims, public administration scholars continue to interpret and compare administrative developments as inheritance, assuming continuity. Thus far, the intellectual traditions of US, French and German Public Administration have not been 'an object of systematic, empirical research' (Raadschelders 2007, p. 6). We aim to introduce an approach that addresses this research gap by analysing the scholarly exchange among the US, the French and the German tradition. In the discussion that follows, it is therefore essential to recapitulate the state of research on transnational fertilizations among scholars from the three countries.

**The State of the Art on the Transfer of Administrative Ideas**

First, with regard to the transfer of ideas from Germany to the US, it should be noted that during the late 19th century, animated intellectual interaction took place between German universities and the nascent American universities. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that during this period, the whole US political science - of which Public Administration cannot be separated at this time - was under great influence from German political theory. In order to deal with their contemporary administrative

problems, Ely, Wilson, and Goodnow consulted Hegel's political philosophy as well
German textbooks on public administration and public law (Heady 1995, p. 64;
Sager and Rosser 2009; Overeem 2010, pp. 55-70; Rosser 2010).

Another significant perception of German administrative thought among American
theoreticians took place after World War II when attention was drawn to Weber's
study of bureaucracy (Raadschelders 1998, pp. 112-35; Beetham 2006; Scaff
2006). Considering Weber's eminent position in administrative research, this repre-
sents a most interesting case of transfer. According to Scaff (2006, p. 56), a re-
quirement for the appreciation of Weber's work among US scholars was 'a certain
resonance or convergence of Weber's basic assumptions and questions with Amer-
ican conditions and with issues having some prominence in American social and
intellectual life'. For example, US students of Public Administration have often
stressed the remarkable similarities between Wilson and Weber's classical con-
ception of Public Administration (Sager and Rosser 2009). Presumably, rather im-
precise translations have helped to foster convergence. Schreurs (2000, p. 70)
reminds us that, for instance, Weber's term *Leistung* was translated as efficiency,
even though performance would have been more fitting. It goes without saying that
efficiency has been a prominent issue in American scholarship ever since the scien-
tific management movement.

In addition, the subject of what ideas Morstein Marx brought from Germany to the
US has not yet been considered in detail. He wrote extensively on both Continental
European and US public administration. Morstein Marx was among the many Ger-
man trained jurists who, before their immigration to the US in the 1930s, had al-
ready held office in German law schools. Like compatriots such as Fried, Löwen-
stein, Morgenthau, Niemeyer and Simons, Morstein Marx later became a well-
known scholar in America (Stiefel and Mecklenburg 1991, pp. 78-80). In the 1960s,
for example, he wrote two articles in the *Public Administration Review* which in-
formed an American readership of the state of the art and the future needs of Ger-
man Public Administration (Marx 1967, 1969). There, he also quoted French au-
thors such as Thuillier, Lenoel, Macarel, and Vivien.

The writings of Mayntz and Scharpf provide examples of how more recent German
research may have influenced Public Administration in America. As far as we know,
no analyses of the transfer of their ideas have been undertaken thus far. Not only
the reception of the administrative thought of Mayntz and Scharpf, not only in the
US, but also in Germany and France, is interesting. Both scholars worked at US

universities and, depending on the context of their writings, they may be interpreted as intellectuals who stand in line with the American intellectual tradition. Their academic work may therefore illustrate how fertilization can actually become cross-fertilization.

As regards the French background of the nascent American Public Administration, it should be mentioned that nearly every early student in the field dealt by some means or other with the political institutionalism of Montesquieu (Rutgers 2000). Furthermore, Martin (1987, p. 297) holds that '[v]irtually every significant concept that existed in the American literature as late as 1937 had already been published in France' by the first half of the 19th century. Authors such as Macarel, Vivien, Dupin and Laboulaye dealt with Public Administration as an autonomous field of study, the politics-administration dichotomy and/or deducible scientific and thus stable principles (for example, POSDCORB) for public administration long before their US colleagues. Whether or not these American and French authors drew similar conclusions independently, for example as a response to a common problem, or whether or not they did so due to the transfer of ideas, has not yet been analysed.

As the following three examples may show, Tocqueville's influence on US Public Administration seems to be equally important to that of Montesquieu. Two years after the first publication of the *Public Administration Review*, Smith drew attention to Tocqueville's 'significance as a thinker on public administration' (Smith 1942, p. 221). According to Smith (1942, p. 229), Tocqueville had excellent knowledge about Continental European administrative practices and, as a consequence, 'was able to apply to the American system standards of evaluation and techniques of analysis virtually unknown on this side of the Atlantic. He was perhaps the first investigator to appraise administrative practices in the United States in terms of such concepts as hierarchy, discipline, coordination, personnel practice, degree of professionalization, and the like'. Interestingly, Tocqueville was one of the first political thinkers to report on the stateless administration in the US (Cook 1996, p. 18). Furthermore, Vincent Ostrom (1997) has dedicated an entire book to Tocqueville's expertise with the aim of asserting the strength of relationships among individuals and their self-organizing behaviour as critical factors for the establishment and survival of a democratic political system.

Fayol's *Industrial and General Management*, which was published in French in 1916 but not translated into English until 1930, was an important source of inspiration for Gulick and Urwick's *Papers on the Science of Administration* which first appeared in

1937 (see Henry 1987, pp. 43-4). A couple of years later, American scholars seem to have forgotten about the French antecedents of their Public Administration (Martin 1987, p. 301). During the conservative 1980s, Fayol's writings became important enough to again be published in the United States. As Wolff (1984, p. xi) declared, argumentations that were considered 'wrong or totally inappropriate to modern management concepts' had been omitted. Furthermore, the terms efficiency and inefficiency were added to some translations of Fayol's work. Schreurs (2000, p. 73) reveals that 'the terms "bon" and "mal" have been translated as "good" and "bad", but have been translated even more often as "efficient" and "inefficient". Although "bon" and "mal" do not necessarily exclude efficient and inefficient, these terms also have a moral connotation. This moral point of view is lost when "bon" is translated as "efficient"'.

Existentialist philosophy probably also exerted a certain influence on US Public Administration, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. Some American scholars such as McCurdy, Richter and Wilcox seem to have been inspired by what Camus, Marcel and Sartre thought about public authorities (Waugh 2006). In the *Handbook of Organization Theory and Management*, Waugh (2006) elaborates on the existentialist public administrator. Finally, attention should be drawn to the writings of Rohr (1993, p. 473; see also 1995) who comes to the conclusion that 'France has long been a fruitful object of comparative studies for American students of public administration. The reason is clear enough: France is sufficiently similar to the United States to make comparisons meaningful and different enough to make them interesting'.

As regards the appreciation of American administrative research in Germany, the perception of Weber's administrative writings serves as another good example to show how fertilization can become cross-fertilization. In the 1960s, many German intellectuals interpreted and criticized Weber's writings, which emphasized the role of a strong bureaucracy, as an anachronistic legitimization of the Nazi regime. It was largely due to American social scientists such as Parsons that by the end of the 1960s the German response to Weber shifted back to a more favourable reception of his concept of power. As Anter (2000, p. 131) points out, 'within a few decades, Weber's ideas were reinterpreted due to their transfer from Germany to the US and back'.

As a general statement, we can say that ever since the end of World War II, American Public Administration has strongly influenced administrative study in Western

Europe. According to Kickert and Stillman (1999, p. 4), 'the postwar developments of administrative sciences in various Western European countries show an almost exclusive orientation toward the United States'. With regard to public management related reforms, we can assume that the influence of US Public Administration on both French and German scholarship has been especially significant since the 1960s. Kickert (2001, p. 28) claims that the reliance of European 'scholars on the Northern American study of Public Administration is striking. This is not surprising because at the time when the European policy and administrative sciences were resurrecting in the post-war welfare states of the 1960s and 1970s, this field was more than half a century old in the United States. The sheer quantity of the accumulated body of knowledge in the United States and the eminent quality of its many renowned PA scholars implied that the American field became the "wise big brother" to admire'.

In post-war Germany, more than 1000 publications on scientific management appeared (Nelson 1992, p. 23). In this context, Gulick and Urwick's *Papers on the Science of Administration* played an important role in German Public Administration. In the 1990s, when American NPM concepts enjoyed popularity among German scholars, classic scientific management principles were reconsidered as well. For example, Kickert (2001, p. 31) states that the 'conceptual frame of reference of a public management derived in Budäus (1994) consists of concepts such as planning, organization, leadership, personnel, and control - highly similar to POSDCORB - and is closely related to the early 20th century American approach to management'.

In France, the scientific management movement was also important. Ironically, Taylor's work was widely noted in France whereas, after a brief period of appreciation, Fayol's writings were largely forgotten. This changed after World War II, when Fayol's administrative ideas were re-introduced by American consultants during the industrial reconstruction and the implementation of the Marshall plan (Braun 1967, Morin 1979, p. xii). Similarly to the Weberian example mentioned above, Americans thus helped European scholars to appreciate their own administrative writings.

With regard to the reception of Public Management concepts in 1960s France, Kickert (2001, p. 30) points to the fact that 'under the influence of the American (business administration) management and organization sciences, concepts such as *gestion publique* and *management publique* were introduced to government as an approach differing from the juridical'. Further case studies on the subject have

been provided by Romano (2003) and Gemelli (1997). However, thus far, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the transfer mechanisms of the import of scientific management concepts and business-based studies from the USA to France and Germany.

Crozier was one scholar who was heavily influenced by his American colleagues. He played a decisive role by creating the sociological school of organizations in France, spreading the idea that public and private organizations can be analysed with the same tools. His theoretical frame was largely inspired by American social psychology, March and Simon's *Organizations* (1958), and later March's (1994) theories of strategic decision. According to Crozier (2002, 2004), the dialogue with his American peers was crucial to escape a French academic field dominated by unempirical structuralism.

In a preliminary conclusion, it seems safe to state that there has been considerable intellectual exchange among US, French, and German Public Administration scholars. However, comparative studies usually conceptualize administrative traditions as largely isolated and autonomous developments. To our knowledge, the empirical substance of administrative traditions has not been analysed in a systematic manner. The two sections that follow are dedicated to the discussion of an analytical framework which aims to fill this gap with a comprehensive examination of the transfer of administrative ideas. We first introduce a theoretical model with which to conceptualize the process of transfer before we turn to a more concrete discussion of how to operationalize this transfer.

**Theorizing the Transfer of Ideas**

We intend to analyse to what extent two underlying (and largely unquestioned) assumptions of comparative Public Administration are valid. On the one hand, we aim to test how far intellectual traditions of Public Administration have developed independently and, on the other hand, we attempt to examine the homogeneity shared within and between the different traditions. We define an intellectual tradition of Public Administration as 'a set of inherited beliefs about the institutions and history of government' that 'someone receives during socialization' (Bevir *et al.* 2003, p. 6). To provide an unambiguous definition of the transfer of ideas, it may be useful to briefly recapitulate the literature on culture transfer - a research strand developed in Germany and France comparatively recently (see, for example, Kaelble 2003; Suppanz 2006). This body of literature constitutes a sub-field of relational history which,

in general, deals with interrelations between culturally distinguishable historical subjects and the emergence of new phenomena as the result of such interrelations (Osterhammel 2003, p. 444). Within the discipline of relational history, the most important concepts used to address these interrelations were labelled diffusion, interdependence, intertextuality, and transfer (Kaelble 2003).

The first distinguishing characteristic between transfer and the other concepts may be found in the focus on either the sending or the recipient culture. While, for example, diffusion analyses may concentrate on the sending culture or put equal importance on both sides, the transfer literature generally focuses on recipient authors and their context. Hence, transfer studies attach more weight to understanding the import than the export of foreign ideas. The second distinguishing characteristic between transfer and the other concepts is intentionality. Whereas transfer is regarded as an intentional and purposeful process, the other concepts are often concerned with unintended, adaptive interrelations (see Osterhammel 2003, p. 448). Scholars dealing with culture transfer usually assume that the incentive of actors to acquire knowledge about another culture is the desire for changing their own intellectual inheritance (Lingelbach 2002, p. 355). In this respect, the logic of interpretation of the transfer-of-ideas approach ties in with Bevir's (2002) approach to the history of ideas. Our assumption is that we 'can explain why people changed their beliefs in the way they did by presenting the new webs of belief as responses to dilemmas that confronted the old ones' (Bevir 2002, p. 200). Bevir (2002, p. 198) suggests that a 'dilemma should be understood here as any new understanding, whether based on an interpreted experience or reflection upon their existing beliefs, that stands apart from one's existing beliefs and so forces a reconsideration of them'. Scholars may adopt new webs of belief when they promise to solve contradictions contained in the old one.

Accordingly, the transfer of ideas is defined as a recipient group of scholars' intentional importation of foreign administrative knowledge. More specifically, the dynamic of the transfer of ideas can be differentiated in three analytical steps: (1) mediation; (2) selection; and (3) reception (Lüsebrink 2001, pp. 215-17). Mediation has to do with the actors who transfer ideas and with the institutions that allow for the transfer (who). Selection processes deal with the texts and scholarly discourses that are chosen to be transferred from one context to the other (what). With regard to method, mediation and selection call for an inductive and descriptive research strategy that aims at finding out the 'who' and 'what' aspects of transfer. In the sec-

tion that follows we will discuss how we intend to identify a body of sources that is adequately representative. Finally, reception processes surround all aspects of how transferred texts are embedded in the context of the recipient intellectual tradition - something we will also touch on.

As regards reception processes, we formulate a model according to which three patterns of reception can be distinguished. The two most extreme conceivable patterns may be labelled rejection and adoption; the intermediary pattern may be called modification. On the one hand, rejection occurs when recipient academicians refer to a foreign author in order to formulate an administrative concept in explicit opposition to this foreign expertise. On the other hand, we speak of adoption when recipient scholars quite literally copy an administrative concept according to its original meaning. Alternatively, modification represents the adequate pattern of reception when a recipient academician adapts a concept according to the domestic experience and consequently changes the concept's original meaning more or less substantively during the transfer.

Since we are dealing with texts written in English, German or French, special attention needs to be paid to the issue of translation. Ideally, a translation is the process of establishing equivalence between the meaning of an utterance in the recipient's and an utterance in the sender's writing. However, as the examples given in the section above indicate, it has to be expected that, in reality, translations usually represent reinterpretations (that is, modifications). It cannot be simply assumed that the meaning of an utterance is language independent. Arguably, the meaning of an utterance is determined by its semantic context (Rutgers 1996). To trace a modification caused by translation, it is therefore indispensable to interpret the recipient's utterance as a contribution to the contemporary discourse in the ideational context of the recipient.

It may be useful to illustrate the respective patterns of reception with three examples. The rejection pattern may be exemplified against the background of the reception of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy among American organizational sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s. In explicit opposition to the Weberian ideal type, scholars such as Presthus and Thompson formulated innovative administrative concepts dealing with bureaucratic dysfunction such as the inefficiency of strict rule application, red tape, and resistance to change (Raadschelders 1998, pp. 112-13). Despite their rejection of Weber's expertise, American scholars 'were in a better

position to understand why bureaucracies went awry' once they had read Weber (McCurdy 1986, p. 37).

To exemplify the adoption pattern, we may refer to Wilson's reception of German ideas about the proper relationship between politics and administration. Very much in the sense of what he had read in Bluntschli's and Stein's textbooks, Wilson contrasted legislation and administration in order to distinguish between general plans and special means of governmental activities. Wilson saw in public administration the means to compensate for the gradual pace of legislation. He thought that a body of altruistic, devoted public servants would promote the common good of society, which he believed had primacy over the good of the individual. The administrative concepts Wilson came to appreciate while reading Bluntschli and Stein apparently inspired him to respond to pressing societal problems. He believed that a powerful administration would save people from the destructive influence of corruption and the egoistic individualism of *laissez-faire* liberalism. In order to protect public administration from these dilemmas, Wilson formulated a politics-administration dichotomy that was very much in the German tradition of thinking about the state and its functions. Hence, our research on Wilson's reception of German administrative theory (Sager and Rosser 2009; Rosser 2010) substantiates the findings of Miewald (1984, p. 18) who concludes that Wilson 'never achieved a thoroughly American administrative theory'.

To illustrate the modification pattern, we may draw attention to the French and German administrative reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars from both countries imported characteristics of American NPM such as business management techniques (for example, steering versus rowing), service and client orientation, privatization, and market-type mechanisms (Kickert 2001, p. 18). However, the French and the German intellectual traditions seem to have set limits on the implementation of NPM reforms. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, pp. 52-3) maintain that traditional philosophies and cultures of governance are crucial when it comes to explaining why Anglo-Saxon countries implement NPM strategies more easily than *Rechtsstaat* systems such as Germany and France. Because of the strong state tradition, Public Administration in France and Germany is less inclined to import ideas from the private sector such as market incentives and competition. The prominence of juridical approaches within Public Administration has additionally complicated the adoption of managerial thinking (Jann 2001; Rouban 2001). We may thus conclude that while the ideas about public management reforms are highly similar

throughout the Western world, the interpretations of these ideas differ (Peters 2001, p. 262).

On the whole, the longitudinal analysis and codification of reception processes will permit us to empirically strengthen or deconstruct the notion of intellectual traditions as incremental path dependencies. If in a specific transfer situation, rejection or a significant modification of foreign knowledge represents the adequate pattern of reception, the finding corroborates the notion of an intellectual tradition as a self-referential path dependency. If, in the reverse conclusion, a transferred concept is only slightly modified or received according to the adoption pattern, the notion of continued intellectual tradition is put into perspective, that is, relativized.

## Measuring the Transfer of Ideas

We consider a content analysis of eminent writings of American, German and French authors of Public Administration to be the appropriate means to analyse the transfer of ideas. Bowen and Bowen (2008, p. 689) understand a content analysis as 'an explicit sequence of steps with which to systematically organize elements of text so as to enable an investigator to meaningfully interpret and make inferences about the patterns in the content of the overall body'. We suggest that in order to comprehensively examine the transfer of ideas, this sequence of steps ought to consist of: (1) identifying the appropriate body of sources; (2) formulating a frame-work to classify the body of sources; (3) applying the classification framework to the individual units of the body of sources; and (4) drawing inferences from the patterns identified in the overall body.

### Identifying an Appropriate Body of Sources

Due to the length of the period under consideration, the quantity of sources for the study of the transfer of administrative ideas among US, French and German schol-ars is potentially overwhelming. A sensible strategy is therefore needed to identify a body of sources that represents the whole. With regard to American authors, McCurdy's (1986) bibliographic guide to the administrative literature provides ac-cess to a representative sample of seminal writings. All the books in his bibliog-raphy 'were identified by cross referencing a series of reading lists, textbook cita-tions, and specialized bibliographies prepared by experts in the field' (McCurdy 1986, p. iv). Sherwood (1990) offers a similar overview of the most influential Amer-ican publications. He asked 25 colleagues to 'recommend the five or six books that

have had the most influence on public administration' (Sherwood 1990, p. 250). As regards Germany and France, two proceedings catalogue the most influential publications of German and French administrative scholars. First, assuming that the most important subjects, authors, and *Leitbilder* are included in textbooks, it will be possible to infer from 20th century textbooks what texts the body of sources should consist of. Second, an expert survey analogue to Sherwood's endeavour will provide us with an alternative sample. As the two approaches yield a different bias, a combination of both types of proceedings promises the best result.

### *Formulating a Framework to Classify the Body of Sources*

To stipulate a framework to classify the body of sources, we draw on the literature dealing with multiple paradigms of Public Administration and interpret the developments of the field of study in the US, France and Germany against the background of paradigms or dominant discourses (see, for example, Henry 1987; Chevallier 1996; Jann 2003; Holzer *et al.* 2007; Yang *et al.* 2008). It goes without saying that any description depicting the development of Public Administration as a mere succession of chronologically and thematically exclusive paradigms is misleading. Such a simplistic understanding does not do justice to the diversity and colour of the field of study. However, as Yang *et al.* (2008, p. 25) claim, it is equally problematic to let 'a hundred flowers bloom without knowing the family lineage of the flowers'. Even if paradigms may be permeable and sometimes mutually overlapping, for the sake of analytical clarity, we conceive of them as fundamentally different.

A paradigm has to do with the inter-subjective production of meaning among a group of administrative scholars. Paradigms usually refer to the fundamental question of what Public Administration ought to be or what it actually is. They constitute a coherent, shared view about 'an intellectual framework that specifies the discipline's proper domain, basic assumptions, appropriate research questions, and rules of inference' (Yang *et al.* 2008, p. 25). As a group of researchers sharing such a coherent view may be interpreted as a discourse community, we operationalize the written manifestation of paradigms with the concept of discourse. According to Rutgers (2003, p. 12), the 'process of conceptualization by a multiplicity of authors and actors can be called a discourse. [...] discourse provides us with a term to capture conceptualization over time. Discourse concerns the continued, enduring and interactive exchange, creation, and debate of shared interpretations (meanings)'. Public Administration in the US, France and Germany may be considered to consist

of several dominant discourses and analysed as such. Consistent with what has
been stated above, it is argued that each new paradigm emerged (partially) as a
reaction to the intellectual dilemmas inherent in another paradigm.

### Applying the Classification Framework to the Individual Units of the Body of Sources

Consistent with the multiple paradigm approach, sources are regarded as artefacts
of a discourse which represents a cluster of writings as a whole, rather than a sum
of individual statements. In order to provide sensible interpretations and, to some
extent, insightful generalizations, the authors of both sides of the Atlantic and their
respective writings ought to be interpreted as belonging to a paradigm. Once we
have classified the relevant sources, our aim is to conduct a citation count as a
surrogate measure of the relative impact of German and French authors on US
administrative thought and vice versa (Lutz 1984). Not until the senders' writings
have been identified in the recipients' texts, will we be able to approach their recep-
tion analytically. Assuming that we can understand the meaning of a text, we can
compare the meaning of an idea in the original publication with the meaning of the
idea as it is applied by the recipient author. In other words, qualitative comparative
text analysis will provide access to the 'how' aspects of transfer.

### Drawing Inferences from the Patterns Identified in the Overall Body

The purpose of the content analysis of eminent American, French and German
administrative writings is to characterize the transfer of administrative ideas among
the respective authors. We aim to recognize patterns of reception of foreign
knowledge among those authors and, subsequently, we intend to make inferences
from these patterns. In order to test for the empirical validity of administrative tradi-
tions, we apply our model one, as discussed above, that distinguishes between the
three patterns of reception: rejection, modification and adoption. Depending on
whether, in a specific transfer situation, the reception lies closer to the pattern of
rejection or adoption, the notion of intellectual traditions can either be substantiated
or put into perspective. On an aggregate level, the content analysis should enable
us to draw insightful conclusions about how administrative scholarship in the US,
France and Germany has been influenced by knowledge from the other side of the
Atlantic.

**The Need for a Closer Look at Traditions of Public Administration**

In this paper, we have illustrated that the statelessness tradition of the US and the stateness tradition of France and Germany represent typical conceptual maps to compare the three countries' administrative developments. Subsequently, we have outlined the transfer-of-ideas approach and have introduced the patterns of rejection, modification and adoption to grasp the empirical substance of the notion of tradition. In this section, we discuss in what respect contemporary research may profit from a comprehensive examination of the reciprocal fertilizations among American, French and German intellectuals.

First, the analysis of the transfer of administrative ideas in general and the distinction between rejection, modification and adoption in particular will help to address the polysemous meanings of and terminological difficulties within administrative concepts. Hitherto, scholars from both sides of the Atlantic have generally used the same vocabulary. This has caused both misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Rutgers (2001, pp. 238-9) holds that, the 'main lesson to be learned is that one has to be careful in borrowing ideas from the other tradition. [...] Similarities are claimed too quickly; closer examination can reveal interesting differences in meaning [...] and thus provide new theoretical and practical insights'. As our research programme deals with the very borrowing of foreign ideas, it will be able to identify similarities and differences in meaning and put them into perspective.

Arguably, it is in the nature of comparative studies that they concentrate on differences between administrative paths rather than analogies. Doing so may suggest that the three paths of Germany, France and the US have always proceeded separately and continue to do so. The transfer-of-ideas approach does not consider spatio-temporal units of analysis, such as administrative paths and their mutual boundaries, *a priori*, as historically adequate descriptions. We do not contend that comparative scholars may not arrive at the same conclusion. They would probably argue that the adequacy of intellectual traditions depends on how high we fly (that is, whether we engage in a micro- or macro-historical study). However, the transfer-of-ideas approach combines different levels of generality. On a micro level, the thorough examination of primary sources enables us to adjust the conceptual maps we apply on the macro level. It is the comparison of individual transfer processes and the longitudinal classification of these processes that provide insights into the

empirical substance of the chosen units of comparison - intellectual traditions of Public Administration - on both the micro and the macro level.

Moreover, in contrast to the plethora of comparative studies, the transfer-of-ideas approach does not give centre stage to parallel structural characteristics and processes of two units of comparison, but to their semantic reinterpretation(s) caused by the very transfer of ideas. Conducting deductive comparative research against the background of self-referential intellectual traditions may have the effect of partly prefiguring the results. The transfer-of-ideas approach does not refrain from relying on clear cut units of comparison as analytical categories. However, 'its inductive orientation aims to limit effects through an investigative mechanism in which the objects, categories, and analytical schemes are adjusted in the course of research' (Werner and Zimmermann 2006, p. 46). As a consequence, hybrid intellectual cultures, something that common sense may accept right from the outset, do no longer form a blind spot in comparative Public Administration. The examination of the transfer of ideas may show that it is more realistic to interpret intellectual traditions as crossbreeds, instead of distinctively and uniquely American, French or German breeds. As a contribution to the history of ideas, the research program arguably matters, for it may uncover 'facts instead of perpetuating fiction' (Raadschelders 2007, p. 18). Just as well as we may find out that intellectual traditions of Public Administration are perpetuating fiction, we may discover that they are actually perpetuating facts.

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# Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy[1]

Fritz Sager and Christian Rosser

*Convergence between Woodrow Wilson's and Max Weber's thought, as well as their differences with regard to the politics-administration dichotomy, can be ascribed to the Hegelian tradition of public administrative theory. On the one hand, Wilson was strongly influenced by Georg W. F. Hegel. On the other hand, there is an empirical connection between Hegel and Weber. Both shared a consciousness of the German bureaucratic tradition based on Hegel's* Philosophy of Right. *These insights have important methodological and theoretical implications for the contemporary comparative study of public administration.*

## Introduction

The similarities between contemporaries Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) and Max Weber (1864-1920) have been widely stressed in public administration research (Cuff 1978, 240; Diggins 1958, 578-80; Fry and Nigro 1996, 39-40; Jackson 1986, 149). These acknowledgments most often relate to Wilson's article "The Study of Administration" (1887), and Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, which he described in *Economy and Society,* published in 1921. Robert D. Cuff states that "the discovery of Weber's academic sociology among American scientists after World War II reinforced the classical principles of public administration advanced by such early American writers as Woodrow Wilson. [...] Wilson and Weber, in other words, converged on similar principles of effective government and the theory derived from their work has been the burden of public administration ever since" (1978, 240). Despite the fact that the convergence between Weber and Wilson is generally acknowledged, thus far there has been no thorough discussion of the underlying reasons for this phenomenon. We consider this paper a contribution to fill that gap.

Why did Weber and Wilson conclude with similar principles of bureaucracy? One explanation is that the two scientists independently created something that was accidentally similar. However, the assumption of a 'historical accident' only seems plausible if no better explanation can be found. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to find a better account. An alternative explanation is that the convergence occurred

because Wilson and Weber drew conclusions from each other's academic work. But we know that this presumption cannot be supported, because neither Weber nor Wilson mentioned or cited the other researcher in his administrative writings.[2]

Moreover, we can rule out the possibility that the convergence between the American and the German had its origin in both scholars' reflections of identical contemporary institutional environments. Heinz-Dieter Meyer states that "formal organizations in the United States emerged under institutional and cultural conditions sufficiently different from those Weber witnessed" (1995, 32; cf. Luton 2003, 175; Overeem 2005, 316-17; Stillman 1997, 332-37). Whereas Weber followed the German administrative tradition to conclude with his ideal type of bureaucracy,[3] Wilson was rather pessimistic about the state of affairs on his continent. As shall be demonstrated, Wilson wanted to change his contemporary administrative system and, in order to find empirical evidence and persuasive arguments for his claim, the American scholar consulted German sources (Miewald 1984, 1994). More precisely, we argue that the convergence between Weber and Wilson can be comprehended by considering the latter's debt to the influential line of thought of the German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831).

It has been stated that both Weber and Wilson shared the view that public administration and politics should be separated. While this is certainly true for Weber's writings on bureaucracy, it is not that obvious in Wilson's case. Therefore, a close examination of the politics-administration dichotomy is important. The first section of this paper will discuss both the uncontested convergence between the two scholars' writings and the politics-administration dichotomy that has been the object of much controversy in the literature. In the second section, we intend to show that the intellectual connection between Wilson and Hegel is quite clear. As to the link between Hegel and Weber, we know that the latter explicitly chose a non-Hegelian epistemological and methodological approach (Weber 1988, 517; 1994, 173). In this respect, we agree with Sven Eliaeson, who observes that "it would be difficult to make a Hegelian out of Weber" (2006, 285; cf. Beetham 1985, 63-67; Whimster 2006, 319).

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[2] Weber attended the St. Louis Exposition of the Congress of Arts and Science in 1904 and may have been inspired by his experiences in the United States (Diggins 1985, 572). Furthermore, he mentioned Wilson's name once in connection with the German participation in the League of Nations (Weber 1919, 11). Nevertheless, we were not able to find reason to assume that any significant, direct interaction on the subject of administrative theory took place between the two authors.
[3] It goes without saying that around the turn of the twentieth century, Germany was not yet what it is now. In this paper, we associate the 'German circumstances' with those in Prussia, which had a hegemonic position after 1871.

Nevertheless, the two Germans' concepts of bureaucracy are strikingly similar. We argue that this is because of an obvious empirical connection between Hegel and Weber. Indeed, both anchored their writings in the typically Prussian administrative tradition. In the third section, we will consider Hegel's conception of the powerful state, and specifically his view of bureaucracy, in detail. Finally, the relevance of our findings for today's public administration theory concerns remains to be discussed in the conclusion.

With regard to method, we shall work hermeneutically with Weber's, Wilson's, and Hegel's texts. In order to avoid inaccuracies, the original language sources will be used along with translations and secondary literature to support the paraphrased passages.[4] The qualitative-descriptive and comparative approach of this essay is aligned with the history of ideas as a dominant line of research in the field of administrative history (Raadschelders 2003, 165).

**Similarities and Differences between Weber and Wilson Reconsidered**

In the following, we first describe the similarities between Weber and Wilson before turning to a more in-depth discussion of the politics-administration dichotomy as a dissimilarity. We find that the main difference between the two scholars' conceptions of the state is that Weber conceived of the state as a mechanistic phenomenon, whereas Wilson saw it as an organism. This conceptual difference has important implications for their notions of the political-administrative relationship.

### *The Convergence between Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson*

Weber believed that "the emergence of the modern state from feudalism is a gradual but irreversible process by which sociopolitical relations have become both institutionalized and impersonalized. […] During the era of absolute monarchy, feudalism faded away and was replaced by the modern administrative apparatus" (Shaw 1992, 382). According to Weber (1990, 209), the continuous rationalization and

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[4] Regarding Weber and Hegel, revised publications are used in this paper. Originally, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of rights were published in 1820 under the title *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Elements of the Philosophy of Right).* Although the year 1821 was printed on the cover of the first edition, it was delivered in autumn of 1820 (Siep 1997, 5). In this paper, we use the fourth Suhrkamp edition of 1995, in which Hegel's personal notes and comments are included. Additionally, we use an English version (1952) of the *Philosophy of Right* translated by T. M. Knox. The edition of Weber's *Economy and Society* (1980) used for this paper has been revised as to the order and amount of texts. It was originally published in 1921 by Weber's wife, one year after his death.

modernization of the Occident is an irreversible *Entzauberung der Welt*.[5] Whereas the development of the Occidental, capitalistic system reflects the modernization of the economy, the formalization of bureaucracy displays the modernization of the state. These two processes are causally interlinked (Weber 1952, 108). Bureaucracy is inevitable "because it is the most efficient, the most calculable, and thus 'formally' the most *rational* means of exercising authority in every form of organization" (Ringer 2004, 220).

Thus, Weber's conception of bureaucracy has to be understood by paying attention to his view of the history of the occident as a steady process called 'modernization'. According to Ali A. Mazrui, "the idea of analyzing and classifying nations on the basis of the stage of modernization […] has long-standing historical connections with a tradition that goes back to social Darwinism and beyond" (1968, 69). However, Weber used Darwinist terminology only in his early work. "After 1895, he moved away from biological language, and his later works cannot be characterized as Social Darwinism" (Weikart 1993, 478-79). Later, he mainly applied technical metaphors, picturing the state and its rational bureaucracy as a mechanism, machine, or apparatus (cf. Anter 1995, 210-17; Treiber 2007, 130; Weber 1972, 321-23; Weber 1980, 570, 682). Hence, Weberian growth or development is more likely of a technical than an organic nature.

Weber disagreed with Hegel's teleological notion of history as he stated that "it is a contravention against the research method, if we look at a 'cultural stage' as something else than a mere term, if we deal with it as a real creature in the sense of organisms […] or as a Hegelian idea" (1988, 517; authors' translation).[6] Accordingly, Weber applied ideal typical historical stages as means of representation in order to analyze Western history in a neutral manner (Treiber 2007, 136). Ideal typically speaking, the modern bureaucracy is the most rational and thus inevitable technical instrument for the organization of government. Especially in his later political writings, he pictured the surpassing rationality of the modern bureaucracy - as we shall clarify later - as a specious phenomenon.

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[5] The phrase *Entzauberung der Welt* can be translated as "disenchantment of the world." According to Edward Shils, "Max Weber regarded the *Entzauberung der Welt* as the elimination of both magical and spiritual forces from the picture of the world; he regarded the refusal to acknowledge these powers as a culmination of one current of the process of rationalization" (1987, 561).

[6] Originally, Weber wrote, "und ein Verstoß gegen die Forschungsmethode ist es, wenn wir eine 'Kulturstufe' als etwas anderes als einen Begriff ansehen, sie wie ein reales Wesen nach der Art der Organismen, mit denen die Biologie zu tun hat, oder wie eine Hegelsche 'Idee' behandeln, welche ihre einzelnen Bestandteile aus sich 'emanieren' läßt" (1988, 517).

Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy satisfies a checklist of distinctive criteria (Weber 1980, 124-30). The rational public administration is based on written rules, an impersonal order, and a clear division of labor. Furthermore, bureaucrats are appointed to administrative offices because of their skills (meritocracy) and not because of their ancestry. The public servant's education is important, and bureaucrats are supposed to be highly specialized professionals. To use the words of Fritz Ringer, public servants are "individual officials (not collegial bodies), recruited into a fixed hierarchy of offices on the basis of qualifications that may be ascertained by examinations and certified by diplomas. They are salaried and often pensioned, and they regard their work as a full-time career" (2004, 183). In sum, Weberian bureaucracy consists of a hierarchically structured, professional, rule-bound, impersonal, meritocratic, appointed, and disciplined body of public servants with a specific set of competencies (Weber 1980, 825-27; see also Ringer 2004, 182-84).

Having considered Weber's writings, we now turn to Wilson's. He was an early exponent of the Progressive reform movement, which was introduced shortly before the turn of the nineteenth century (Hofstadter 1974, 131-73; Raadschelders 2000, 499-510; Walker 1989, 509-25). According to Larry Walker, "Progressivism was a rebellion against limited government and the individualism of nineteenth-century liberalism. It accepted collectivism, the welfare of the community as a whole, as a positive value" (1989, 512). The exponents of the movement, who were mainly urban white Protestants,[7] opposed the increasing number of monopolies in the economy and the spoils system in the United States (McLean 1996, 407; Putnam 2000, 368-401).

Most fundamentally, Wilson wanted to know what the state should do and how it could do it most efficiently. He intended to conquer the corrupt and confusing administrative circumstances in the United States with a public administration based on scientific research. In this context, Wilson stated, "The poisonous atmosphere […], the crooked state of administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that

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[7] With regard to Wilson's intellectual background, some authors have emphasized the strong influence of religion in general and Calvinism in particular on his work. For example, Robert D. Cuff writes that "it is from his evangelical impulse […] that Wilson derived not only an idealism – even utopianism – alien to Weber, but also a hopefulness about the future which the German theorist could not share" (1978, 241). Furthermore, with regard to the emergence of the modern administrative U.S. state in general, it might be interesting to consult Richard J. Stillman's *Creating the American State: The Moral Reformers and the Modern Administrative World They Made* (2002). He argues that the administrative apparatus originated from a complex set of ideas which were influenced by strong moral idealism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely current in the United States" (1887, 201). In order to criticize the American situation, he often referred to European examples. In *The State* and in "The Study of Administration", one finds many comparisons between Western political systems, especially between those of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain (Wilson 1887, 1892). Wilson explicitly argued, "So far as administrative functions are concerned, all governments have a strong structural likeness; more than this, if they are to be uniformly useful and efficient, they *must* have a strong structural likeness. A free man has the same bodily organs […] as the slave. […] Monarchies and democracies, radically different as they are in other respects, have in reality much the same business to look to" (1887, 218).

It may be a matter of contention how deliberately Wilson addressed his interest to German sources in order to find arguments and empirical evidence for his appeal to change his contemporary administrative system. Here, we comply with a theoretical argument from trans-cultural historical studies that holds that people who are interested in changing their own society acquire knowledge about another society (Lingelbach 2002a, 355; Middell 2000, 21). Hence, it is the desire for social reform that determines the import of a specific intellectual concept. It goes without saying that the transfer of ideas is usually a selective process. In fact, transferred concepts are most often adapted to the importer's intentions (Lingelbach 2002a, 355-56). Empirically, we find evidence in favor of Wilson's deliberate introduction of German ideas as well as his intention to adapt them according to U.S. circumstances. For example, he stated that there "is a science of administration, but it is not of our making. […] It has been developed by German and French Professors and […] must be Americanized, not in language only, but in thought, in principle, in aim as well, before it can be of any use to us in the solution of our own problems of administration in town, city, county, State, and Nation. […] It must drink less beer and inhale more American air. But have it we must, even if it be necessary to import it and give it new ideas" (Link 1968, 52). In "The Study of Administration", Wilson (1887, 201-202) made comparable statements.

In his comparative historical research, Wilson applied a methodology quite similar to Weber's, even though he did not conceive of historical stages as ideal typical constructions but rather as adequate descriptions of an evolutionary development. In *The State,* one can find examples of the American's notion of progress. For example, Wilson wrote that "the great stages of development have remained throughout

clear and almost free from considerable irregularities. Tested by history's long measurement, the lines of advance are seen to be singularly straight" (1892, 576). Furthermore, the development of public administration is described explicitly in "The Study of Administration", in which it is pictured as a slow and steady evolution that proceeds through three phases. In the first phase, the absolute European rulers would install centrally organized, effective administrations. In the second phase, constitutions would be framed in order to replace the absolute ruler with democratic control. In the third phase, the sovereign people would change the administration according to "this new constitution which has brought them into power" (Wilson 1887, 204). Apparently, Wilson felt that no absolutist 'top-down' centralization of the executive authority could have taken place in the United States. As a consequence, a confusing and corrupt, highly fragmented administrative system resulted.

As in Weber's writings, the perception of Western history as a 'linear modernization' can also be discovered in Wilson's work. The latter, however, placed considerably more emphasis on the evolutionary process than Weber. On the subject of "progress," Wilson asked, "What […] is the nature of government? […] The answer is hidden in the nature of society itself. Society is in no sense artificial; it is as truly natural and organic as the individual man himself. […] Society, therefore, is […] an evolution of experience, an interlaced growth of tenacious relationships, a compact, living, organic whole, structural, not mechanical" (1892, 597). Apparently, Wilson's organic conception of development did not change significantly during his career. In accordance with his earlier statement, he wrote in 1913 that "[l]iving political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and practice. Society is a living organism and must obey the laws of life, not of mechanics, it must develop" (cited in Diggins 1985, 579).

Fundamentally, Wilson wanted the traditionally limited power of the executive in the United States to be increased. In an effort to make the executive less vulnerable, he intended to formalize administrative law: "Public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of general law is an act of administration" (Wilson 1887, 212). Wilson argued in favor of a hierarchical organization of the bureaucracy: "There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. […] if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched and brought to book" (213-14). In addition, he asked for a professionalized, educated body of public servants by claiming that a "technically schooled civil service will presently have become indispensable" (216). These

professionally qualified public servants would learn to act in favor of the common will: "A body of thoroughly trained officials serving during good behavior we must have in any case: that is a plain business necessity" (216). In a nutshell, Wilson intended to install a scientific, professional, meritocratic, clear-cut, rule-based, and therefore trustworthy bureaucracy. He considered these measures indispensable for increasing the executive's power and replacing the corrupt spoils system.

In sum, Weber and Wilson converged on similar principles of effective public administration. Both pictured a formalized, professionalized, hierarchically organized, and meritocratic public administration. Furthermore, their works display at least a similar notion of the historical process that led to the emergence of public administration as the most effective form of government. However, Wilson placed more emphasis on organic growth. This emphasis is the source of the difference between the two authors' writings. According to John P. Diggins, Wilson "did not seem to fear, as did Weber, that government based upon the principles of organic growth would lead to higher forms of development resulting in the atrophy of bureaucratization and specialization" (1985, 579). The distinction between an organic and a mechanist conception of the state is highly important because it leads to a deeper understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy in Wilson's work that has been the object of much controversy in the literature. It has been stated that both theoreticians envisioned a strict separation between the political and the administrative sphere. While this is certainly true for Weber, it is not obvious in Wilson's case. In order to further illuminate this distinction, a closer examination of the dichotomy question is necessary.

### *The Differences between Weber and Wilson:* **Sine ira et studio** *versus* **ira et studium**

Brian R. Fry and Lloyd G. Nigro claim that "[t]he definition of the proper role of the administrator in a democratic society has long been a matter of contention. It has been a central concern in the literature of US public administration from the beginning, and remains so to this day. Typically, the public administration literature addresses this issue in the context of the policy-administration dichotomy" (1996, 37). The discussion over whether public servants should be actively involved in the political process, whether they should advocate particular policies, and what standards their actions should be based on has been a source of controversy in administrative history research. According to Larry S. Luton, "The separation of politics and

administration found a long-lasting anchorage in the doctrine about the separation of powers, which has found its most popular expression in Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* (1748)" (2003, 179). In the following section, Weber's firm position in relation to the politics-administration dichotomy will be illustrated, followed by a description of Wilson's more controversial position.

Weber (1980, 572) recognized that the power of the modern bureaucracy was in danger of becoming overwhelming. His position regarding this power was ambivalent. One the one hand, he saw the modern bureaucracy as the only rational form of organization, which was "not only inevitable, but ultimately desirable as well" (Ringer 2004, 221). On the other hand, especially in his later works, he expressed his doubts about the influence of modern public administration (Ringer 2004, 220-24; Treiber 2007, 121-47). According to Michael W. Jackson, "Weber feared that bureaucracy would enslave us all" (1986, 149). Therefore, in order to make the state work efficiently and rationally and to control the public servant's influence, a strict separation of the political and the administrative spheres seemed indispensable. In *Politics as a Vocation* (1919) as well as in *Economy and Society,* Weber distinguished between the political leaders and the public servants: Whereas the politicians had to prove themselves in the legislative and the electoral process and fulfill their duties with an ethic of responsibility, the administrators had to perform their administrative tasks neutrally and follow their political masters to the point of self-denial. Explicitly, Weber stated that "the passionate struggle for power - 'ira et studium' - is the politician's element, whereas the bureaucrat should strive to execute legal orders dutifully, without anger and passion - 'sine ira et studio'" (1980, 833; authors' translation; cf. Weber 1992, 190).[8] Hence, to put it in Patrick Overeem's words, the German scholar "argued that it was essential that administration stay out of politics" (2005, 316).[9]

In the United States, technical maxims of bureaucracy very similar to Weber's were thought to be a requirement of modern American society until the second half of the

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[8] Originally, Weber wrote, "Sine ira et studio, 'ohne Zorn und Eingenommenheit,' soll der Beamte seines Amtes walten. […] Parteinahme, Kampf, Leidenschaft – ira et studium – sind das Element des Politikers" (1980, 833).

[9] Quite certainly, David Beetham would qualify this conclusion. He draws attention to Weber's political writings, in which the administrator "does not only act entirely *sine ira et studio,* but his outlook is affected by the presumptions of social class […]. As a power group it [the bureaucracy] has the capacity to influence the goals of the political system; as a status stratum it has a more unconscious effect upon the values of society at large" (1985, 67). Beetham generally thinks that "it is mistaken to draw too sharp a distinction between Weber's political and sociological writings – scientific the one, polemical and value-laden the other" (2006, 343).

twentieth century (Meier and Krause 2003, 2-3). Later, the predominant conception of public administration faced a crisis (Ostrom 1973). Political pluralists and public choice scholars called the classical politics-administration dichotomy into question. It was doubted whether a distinctive esprit de corps would guide administrators to act altruistically. Rather, it was believed that as rational human beings, public servants would maximize their personal interest and complete their dominance in the technocratic system (Downs 1967, 2; Niskanen 1973; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971, 205-6). In this context, Weber and Wilson were lumped together with the intention of criticizing the classical doctrines of administration as clearly un-American. It was stated that "[i]nsofar as Wilson subscribed to such doctrines, he stands with Weber in the anti-democratic tradition of administrative thought" (Cuff 1978, 240). However, it is less clear how far Wilson actually subscribed to the classical doctrine concerning the strict separation of politics and administration.

Despite the fact that Wilson's administrative work was only rarely cited until World War II (Van Riper 1984, 208), his early paper "The Study of Administration" (1887) has often been described as having had a huge impact on the development of the field of administrative science in general and on the politics-administration dichotomy in particular. According to Paul P. Van Riper, a significant part of the administrative literature inaccurately contends that Wilson's "dichotomy was essentially influential in the development of those distinctions between politics and administration which today are often viewed as unfortunate. In essence, we *blame it all* on Wilson" (1984, 204; cf. Martin 1988, 631; Raadschelders 2002, 580; Rosenbloom 2008, 57; Walker 1989, 510-11). Hence, it might be stated that Wilson's standpoint regarding a firm politics-administration dichotomy has become somewhat of a legend. In the following, we will show that Wilson's position on the politics-administration dichotomy was not as firm as Weber's. Instead, the American remained ambivalent about that subject.

There are a number of convincing arguments in favor of a firm Wilsonian dichotomy. For example, Wilson wrote very positively about the German bureaucratic system, in which a "sovereign guiding will in administration" (1892, 589) is politically formed and the administration executes this will without "passion and anger." He might have wanted to apply the German example to the United States when he claimed, "Bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the common political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic" (1887, 216-17).

Furthermore, advocates of a clear Wilsonian distinction between the political and administrative spheres might refer to the following quotation: "The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics. […] Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices" (Wilson 1887, 209-10). These statements seem to indicate that there is a firm politics-administration dichotomy in Wilson's conception of bureaucracy.

However, Wilson also made statements regarding the proper role of politicians and public servants that diverge from Weber's firm position. For example, he recommended that "the administrator should have and does have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument" (1887, 212). Furthermore, he stated in a lecture about the "Functions of Government" held in 1888 at Johns Hopkins University that "it is absurd to apply the principles of economics merely to the tasks of politics. Business-*like* the administration of govt. [government] may and should be - but it is not business. It is *organic social life*" (Link 1968, 690). Once more, Wilson's emphasis on organic growth becomes apparent. Even though the organs of the state were supposed to function separately, they had to serve the same purpose collectively. In 1892, he wrote that, in theory, there may be "a division of organs and there is of course a real distinction between Legislation and Administration. […] But in practice, there has been no sharp differentiation of organs to correspond to the full with these differences of function. The object of actual developments [is] not a system of mechanical checks and balances, but simply organic differentiation. […] no part overworked, but each skilled and instructed by specialization; each part coördinated with and assisted by all others; each part an organ, not to serve a separate interest, but to serve the whole" (Link 1969b, 383; cf. Wilson 1892, 591). In accordance with his holistic notion of the state, Wilson appreciated the political role of the public administration. In his work, "[t]he political significance of administrative tasks follows from the organic model" (Miewald 1984, 24). In a desirable state, the distinctive organs needed to be combined.

In summary, despite the fact that some statements suggest a clear Wilsonian politics-administration dichotomy, it would be imprecise to claim that the American scholar had a firm position. According to Walker, "Wilson never sought to erect a strong wall between politics and administration. […] In later years, he stressed in his lectures the policy making (hence, political) role of the administrator, not a clear,

sharp separation of politics and administration" (1989, 510-11). Most importantly, he aimed at a change of his contemporary circumstances. He wanted to install a body of responsible, ethically correct public servants who were educated to serve the common will. In contrast to Weber, Wilson did not place an emphasis on strictly excluding administrators from political, passionate business. As Cuff states, it should not be forgotten that "[g]iven the American historical context of the 1880's when Wilson wrote 'The Study of Administration,' it is hardly to be supposed that he would regard the bureaucracy with the same anxiety as Weber. Creation, not control was the central issue; private, not public power, the chief threat to liberty" (1978, 241). If anything, the American scholar intended to take (partisan) "politics out of administration" and not vice versa as it was Weber's objective (Overeem 2005, 317; cf. Rosenbloom 2008, 57-60).

As a consequence, a distinct position on either side fails to do justice to the historical circumstances. While Wilson may have introduced some classical American public administration doctrines, it should be remembered that authors such as Leonard D. White, Luther Gulick, and Lyndall Urwick promoted the principle of the Weberian distinction between politics and administration in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s (Rosenbloom 2008, 57-60; Van Riper 1984, 203). It was under their influence that administrative doctrines comparable to Weber's were comprehensively developed, even if they used a method different to the German's (Meier and Krause 2003, 2-3).

With regard to comparing Weber and Wilson, we conclude that there are many striking similarities between their conceptions of public administration. However, there are also important differences between their views, especially with respect to a clear politics-administration dichotomy. Wilson, on the one hand, highlighted the organic development of public administration and thus the 'harmonious' relationship between the political and the administrative sphere, where - if anything - (partisan) politics should stay out of administration. Weber, on the other hand, who mainly used mechanical language, envisioned a strict politics-administration dichotomy in order to keep the highly efficient and effective but potentially overwhelming bureaucratic apparatus out of politics.

**Hegel as the Missing Link**

Influenced by Hegel, many Germans after 1850 saw the state and its power as a condition of national and individual freedom (Schieder 1984, 10). Robert D. Miewald

states that "through such writers as Wilson, a massive dose of the German school found its way into the study of administration in the United States" (1984, 18). This paper argues that the similarities between Wilson's and Weber's conception of public administration and the differences regarding the politics-administration dichotomy can be traced to Wilson's debt to Hegel's influential line of thought.

The striking similarities between Weber's and Hegel's writings on public administration have been widely stressed in the literature (Gale and Hummel 2003, 409-18; Jackson 1986, 139-57; Knapp 1986, 599-606; Shaw 1992, 381-89; Spicer 2004a, 97-102; Welty 1976). Even though Hegel is not cited directly in Weber's vast work, we know that many elements of the Hegelian philosophy of history and of law were brought to Weber through Karl Marx (Knapp 1986, 599-604). Interestingly, the latter attributed an "empirical description of bureaucracy" to Hegel (Marx 1961, 247; authors' translation). Peter Knapp notes that "many figures who informed Weber's sociology were powerfully influenced by Hegel even as they contested Hegelian positions" (1986, 601). As stated earlier, Weber himself challenged Hegel's epistemological and methodological approach. Because of this, we believe all the more that the reason for the two Germans' similar concepts of bureaucracy is quite simple. In agreement with Michael W. Spicer, we suggest that "a large part of the similarities in the ideas of Hegel and Weber about bureaucracy and the state may be traced […] to their shared consciousness of Prussian history and experience" (2004a, 101; cf. 2001, 43-45). Indeed, many passages in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* seem to have their origin in the *Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten* of 1794 (Welty 1976, 3), a significant legal document that Weber (1980, 494) appreciated, too.[10]

With regard to Wilson, we are generally aware of a significant transfer of academic ideas from Germany to the United States in connection with the nascent social sciences in the nineteenth century (see, e.g., Jarausch 1988; Lingelbach 2002b, 2003; Spicer 2001, 48-49). For example, we know that Wilson's professors George S. Morris, Herbert B. Adams, and Richard T. Ely studied in Heidelberg, Halle, and Berlin, respectively, where they had contact with Hegel's prominent line of thought

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[10] For the sake of historical adequacy, it should be mentioned that the Prussian bureaucracy developed from a premodern to a modern bureaucracy from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. Hence, Weber, who worked almost a century after Hegel, witnessed an administrative organization that differed quite substantially from the one Hegel experienced. Nevertheless, we contend that the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Prussian bureaucratic tradition persisted into the twentieth century. Obviously, the whole historical development was known to Weber.

(Fine 1951, 600; Fries 1973, 394; Wenley 1917, 109-17). Although prestigious researchers habitually put more emphasis on Wilson's British "intellectual heroes" (Stillman 1973, 583; cf. Karl 1976), his German academic background can be considered a well-established fact (Link 1947, 21; Luton 1999, 212; Miewald 1984, 17; Mulder 1978, 103; Raadschelders 2002, 589; Stillman 1973, 583; Thorsen 1988, 134-35). Hence, it seems safe to state, in the words of Spicer, that in the United States "[e]arly public administration teachers and writers were clearly both impressed by German administrative practice and influenced by various German ideas, including those of Hegel" (2001, 48).

Hegel's influence on Wilson is quite evident. First and foremost, *The Philosophy of Right* appears in Wilson's working bibliographies (Link 1969a, 586-87; 1970a, 129). In order to underline the necessity of a new administrative science, Wilson highlighted the historical changeableness of scientific phenomena with a Hegelian statement: "The philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, 'nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract thought'; and political philosophy, like philosophy of every other kind, has only held up the mirror to contemporary affairs" (1887, 199). Between 1884 and 1885, Wilson learned about the Hegelian field of knowledge during Morris's course on the "Philosophy of the State" at Johns Hopkins University (Link 1967, 335, 345). For Morris, Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* represented "the high-water mark […] in the treatment of the philosophical conception of the state" (1885, 163). To those students who were not able to read in German, Morris recommended Elisha Mulford's *The Nation.* Like Morris, Mulford (1881, 7-8) was - as he acknowledged himself - highly influenced by Hegel. Not only was Wilson able to read Hegel's work in the original language (Link 1968, 385, 410), he also consulted *The Nation,* which furnished him "with inspiration and philosophy" (Link 1968, 303).

Additionally, Wilson was influenced by Johann K. Bluntschli's writings on bureaucracy (Spicer 2001, 44). He characterized "Dr. Bluntschli [as] that most modern of Germans" (Link 1968, 54). As Bluntschli's private library was acquired by Johns Hopkins University in 1882, Wilson had easy access to his expertise (Adams 1885, 122). Wilson made extensive use of Bluntschli's books while writing *The State* as well as during his lectures on administration and public law (Link 1969b, 454; 1970a, 126-27; 1970b, 15, 35-44; Wilson 1892, 16, 128, 175, 333, 636). Furthermore, he advised his students to consult Bluntschli's *Staatsrecht* and his *Theory of the State* as "collateral reading in public law" (Link 1970b, 99). Wilson must have come across elements of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* during his reading of the

Swiss scholar. Actually, Bluntschli (1875, 79) appreciated Hegel for his historical reflections on the development as well as the accentuation of the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) of the state.

Finally, Lorenz von Stein's writings were well known to Wilson. In fact, it was Stein who brought Hegel's notion of bureaucracy to the United States in a compact form (Miewald 1984, 17-30). He applied the Hegelian dialectic to systematize the political economy and administrative theory (Koslowski 1989, 53-74). Wilson cited Stein during his lectures on administration and public law in order to define the very object of his investigation and the scope of administrative functions: "The Nature of Administration […] is the continuous and systematic carrying out in practice of all the tasks which devolve upon the State […]. It deals directly, indeed, and principally with the structural features and the operative organs of state life; […] 'Die Idee des Staates ist das Gewissen der Verwaltung' (Stein).[11] The organs of government are nothing without the life of government; and the organs of each State must advertise, in their peculiarities, the individual and national characteristics of the State to which they belong" (Link 1970b, 28-29; cf. Link 1969b, 124). Furthermore, it seems that the American applied Stein's *Handbuch der Verwaltungslehre* with the intention of emphasizing the organic nature of government. What could be discovered in the foregoing citation becomes even more apparent in the following quote. Paraphrasing Stein (1870, 3-4), Wilson wrote that "[e]very State is the historical form of the organic common life of a particular people, some form of organic political life, being in every instance commanded by the very nature of man. No nation has ever been without an organic common life; nor can any nation ever break the continuity of that organic common life without instantly ceasing to be a nation" (Link 1969b, 124). A rather jocular reference might give more evidence of how extensively Wilson relied on the German scholar's expertise. In 1891, Wilson informed one of his students at Johns Hopkins University that Stein's *Handbuch der Verwaltungslehre* would form a part of the exam for a "Minor in Administration" (Link 1969b, 167).

So far, we have argued that it is due to Hegel's influential line of thought that Wilson and Weber converged on similar conceptions of public administration. A discussion of the Hegelian line of thinking will further support this claim.

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[11] In 'The Study of Administration,' Wilson translated the exact same passage of Stein's administrative handbook as "the idea of the State is the conscience of administration" (1887, 201).

## Hegel's Theory of Modern Bureaucracy

Hegel perceived the state as an organism. Even though this might be considered a triviality, it is still the first and most obvious similarity between Hegel's and Wilson's writings. In the German philosopher's work, it is the organic body that dissolves the antagonism between identity and nonidentity, or, to put it differently, that constitutes an integrated whole of individual parts. With regard to the functions of the state, Hegel distinguished nonidentical organs within the state. In terms of the purpose of the whole system, however, he pinpointed an identity of the organs: life (§269;[12] cf. Gessmann 1999, 39; 127-28). Indeed, the 'organism' runs through the Hegelian teleological philosophy as a leitmotif. With their organic notion of the state, Hegel and Wilson stand in contrast to Weber. The following section will discuss Hegel's positions on the concept of the state more thoroughly. Because Hegel understood the emergence of the modern public administration as an inevitable historical consequence, his general view of history will be considered first. Then his theory of bureaucracy will be described, before turning to our discussion of Hegel's analogies with Weber and Wilson.

### *The Emergence of the Rational State*

Hegelian world history is not a sequence of accidental events. "It is rather the achievement of mankind working through history to gain a proper understanding of its developing nature and how best it can live, and struggling to put these insights into effect" (Knowles 2002, 18). The Hegelian notion of history includes a dialectical process toward the institution of freedom, or, to use his words, toward an absolute self-knowledge of the *Weltgeist* (spirit of the world). Basically, each successive period corrects the failures of the epochs that preceded it.

Hegelian *social* history is seen as a sequence of several types of *Volksgeister* (spirits of the people) that develop from an incomplete community toward an ever more complete, absolute form of community (Baberowski 2005, 52). "In history the dialectical processes of reason have generated a succession of forms of social life which failed because they were able to recognize only a contradictory or one-sided conception of human spirit" (Knowles 2002, 18). According to Hegel, feudalist structures had been replaced during the absolutist period, and the rational state with its

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[12] In Hegel's work, instead of referring to page numbers, it is customary to refer to paragraph numbers, which are the same in every edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.

formalized bureaucracy had emerged (Shaw 1992, 382). In this rational state, individuals would recognize that they were part of the expression of the *Weltgeist,* or that they were part of a complete and thus free community. Hegel explicitly stated that the "state is the actuality of the ethical idea" (§257).

Hence, there is a striking parallelism between Hegel's and Wilson's notions of history, especially their explanations for the emergence of the rational state (Zentner 2005, 119-24). Taking Weber into consideration, all three theoreticians saw the periods of 'feudalism' and 'absolutism' as important determinants of the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state. With regard to 'organic' terminology, Wilson apparently followed Hegel, whereas Weber did not. The following paragraphs describe the Hegelian public administration more thoroughly in order to show how strikingly his ideas converge not only with Wilson's but also with Weber's concept of bureaucracy.

### Hegel's Concept of Public Administration

Just as Wilson would fear some decades later, Hegel assumed that "[c]ivil society produces misery and displays extravagance and all varieties of corruption" (Knowles 2002, 283). It may have been for that reason that the German scholar dedicated a considerable number of paragraphs in *The Philosophy of Right* to the "public authority charged with the infrastructural tasks necessary for the effective operation of the economy and the administration of justice" (Knowles 2002, 285). According to Carl Shaw, "Hegel sees bureaucracy as the main governing organization in the modern state" (1992, 381). The relationship between the individual's welfare and civil society is of high importance,[13] especially the individual's need to be organized in order to guarantee one's personal welfare. In this context, Hegel wrote, "Given good laws, a state can flourish, and freedom of property is a fundamental condition of its prosperity. Still, since I am inextricably involved in particularity, I have a right to claim that in […] association with other particulars, my particular welfare too shall be promoted" (§233). Hence, public administration must guarantee that good laws are executed in order to maximize the welfare of the individuals.

Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that Hegel considered it the individual's "supreme duty […] to be a member of the state" (§258). In addition to individual

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[13] Hegel was one of the first to use the term *bürgerliche Gesellschaft,* which is translated as "civil society" in the English version of *The Philosophy of Right.* For him, civil society stands between the political state and family life (Knowles 2002, 261–62).

welfare, the state ought to promote the welfare of society as a whole. According to Hegel, maximal public welfare is not the sum of individual welfares. Rather than relying on an invisible hand, the state should execute its tasks with a clearly visible hand in order to strike the right balance between the individual and the common will. Between individual and public welfare, there has to be "formed a system of complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all" (§183). In §236, Hegel specified the tasks of public administration more precisely: "It has to undertake street-lighting, bridge-building, the pricing of daily necessaries, and the care of public health. […] The individual must have a right to work for his bread as he pleases, but the public also has a right to insist that essential tasks shall be properly done. Both points of view must be satisfied, and freedom of trade should not be such as to jeopardize the general good." Bureaucracy is needed for two reasons. First, it is indispensable for the protection of each individual's property and thus for the promotion of every individual's welfare. Second, the combination of personal and public welfare must be carefully organized in order to guarantee the happiness and rights of all (§188).

Hegel's concept of bureaucracy is very similar to Wilson's and Weber's. Hegel also argued in favor of a formalized, rule-bound, administrative system: "The nature of the executive functions [of public administration] is that they are objective and that in their substance they have been explicitly fixed by previous decisions" (§291; cf. §283 and §290). Furthermore, he wanted the bureaucracy to be organized hierarchically: "The security of the state and its subjects against the misuse of power by ministers and their officials lies directly in their hierarchical organization and their answerability" (§295). With regard to recruiting public servants, Hegel advocated a meritocratic system. Appointment to office should be open to everyone. He specified that "individuals are not appointed to office on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The *objective* factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the state will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants" (§291). Hegel additionally stated, like Weber, that the professional public servant "finds in his office his livelihood and the assured satisfaction of his particular interests" (§294). In summary, all three administrative scholars shared the view of a formalized, professionalized, hierarchically organized, and meritocratic form of organization of public administration.

Like Weber, Hegel saw the possibility of self-interested public servants, and thus the threat of a self-perpetuating bureaucracy (§295). One of his propositions to restrict the power of the administrative apparatus was, as has just been mentioned, a hierarchical bureaucratic structure. In addition, he wanted control to "come from within the bureaucracy and ultimately from within each bureaucrat" (Jackson 1986, 149). He hoped that a new class of servants to the common will, rather than rulers of that will, would be established: "Civil servants and the members of the executive constitute the greater part of the middle class, the class in which the consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of the mass of the people is found" (§297). In order to develop a consciousness of right, or, to put it in Stein's and Wilson's words, to make the idea of the state the conscience of administration, public servants had to be educated. Hegel wrote that "the fact that a dispassionate, upright, and polite demeanor becomes customary […] is […] a result of direct education in thought and ethical conduct" (§296). But not only was the moral education important to the German philosopher. If the merely technical instruction of public servants or, in other words, the "so-called 'science' of matters connected with administration" were combined with ethical aspects, an altruistic as well as an effective government would result. Hence, a significant part of "Hegel's solution to the […] problem of the selfishness […] of bureaucracy was to school bureaucrats in a moral *as well* as a functional mission" (Jackson 1986, 149; emphasis added).

Hegel thus interpreted the bureaucracy as a mixed blessing, quite similarly to Weber. But his remedy for an overly potent position of public servants was not a politics-administration dichotomy. He preferred control to have its source inside the administration. Hegel's emphasis on the bureaucrat's moral and technical education may be evocative of Wilson's own claim for altruistic officials and his call for an administrative science. It seems sensible to contend that Wilson agreed with Hegel. Both may have believed that if "the bureaucrats lack political virtue, it will not be possible for citizens to identify with the political community. Consequently, there will be no political community, no rational state, but only a sham" (Jackson 1986, 152).

Weber, Wilson, and Hegel concluded with conceptions of public administration that were largely comparable. All three saw the emergence of rational administrative structures as an inevitable historical consequence. Furthermore, they unanimously described the public administration as formalized, professionalized, hierarchical, and meritocratic. All three authors intended to find the optimal balance between individual freedom and the authority of the state. With regard to the politics-

administration dichotomy, it can be concluded that Weber did not emphasize the "same side of the balance" as Hegel and Wilson. Weber advocated a firm politics-administration dichotomy in order to keep the administration out of politics. Wilson, however, agreed with Hegel, who believed that thoroughly educated and thus morally upright public servants would best serve the common will. For Hegel as well as for Wilson, a strict distinction between the political and the administrative sphere was less important than for Weber. For Wilson, creation, not control, was the central issue. In his view, private power and not public authority was the main threat to freedom. In Hegel's influential line of administrative thought, he may have found arguments to support a strong executive with a powerful, scientific public administration, which may have looked un-American to many of his compatriots. It has been stated that in Hegelian history, each successive period corrects the failures of the previous epochs. We think that Wilson followed Hegel on many aspects of administrative theory because it was obvious to him that U.S. administration was mired in several failures. The similarities and differences between the three scholars' arguments are summarized in table 1.

**Table 1**: Conceptions of Public Administration: Weber, Wilson, and Hegel

| Criteria of Public Administration | Weber | Wilson | Hegel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notion of modernization | *Technical rationalization* | **Evolutionary (organic growth)** | **Evolutionary (organic growth)** |
| Centralization, hierarchy of offices | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Professionalization | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Specialized education of public servants | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Recruitment of public servants | **Meritocracy** | **Meritocracy** | **Meritocracy** |
| Formalization (execution of tasks based on rational law) | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Politics-administration dichotomy | *Administration out of politics* | *Political and economic interests out of administration* | *No* |

**Bold =** convergence, *italics* = no convergence

**Conclusion**

This paper has attempted to show that Hegel's political philosophy, especially his work on bureaucracy, may help us understand the convergence between Weber's and Wilson's administrative concepts. It has been shown that they explained the emergence of bureaucratic structures similarly. However, Wilson put more emphasis on an evolutionary process, on organic growth, whereas Weber described the development of the administrative apparatus as a technical rationalization. With regard to 'historical improvement', we contend that Wilson followed Hegel, in whose work the 'organism' runs through as a leitmotif.

Fundamentally, we argue that both Hegel and, eight decades later, his compatriot Weber anchored their writings in the German tradition of a strong state with a strong executive and, consequently, with an extensive body of public servants. Hegel's influential line of administrative thought contributed to the American Progressive movement. In this respect, the German philosopher's influence on U.S. administrative theory has been underestimated. Obviously, Hegel's work on the subject of public administration is less explicit and, therefore, more difficult to appreciate than Weber's. The present paper may serve as an attempt to make Hegel's bureaucratic concept more easily accessible.

On the whole, we think that it is due to a notable degree to the typically German administrative tradition that American Progressive intellectuals advocated a hierarchical and thus centralized, professionalized, as well as formalized public administration. In order to change the apparently inefficient and corrupt administrative situation in the United States, Wilson studied European sources. He found convincing political arguments in favor of an enlarged executive and against corruption in Hegel's political philosophy. Thus, we believe that it is because of Wilson's debt to the Hegelian body of knowledge or, in a broader sense, the German administrative tradition that he converged so interestingly with Weber in many points.

Additionally, we have argued that Weber and Wilson have sometimes been inaccurately compared with regard to the politics-administration dichotomy. Weber put more emphasis on a firm separation between the political and the administrative sphere. He aimed at taking the highly rational and thus potentially overwhelming administration out of politics. The reading of Hegelian political philosophy, however, allowed Wilson to believe in a class of educated, morally upright public servants who would serve the common will instead of their own egoistic interests. Wilson

considered responsible bureaucrats a realistic option. Therefore, it was not important for him to advocate a strict separation of the public administration and politics. If anything, Wilson wanted to reduce egoistic politicians' influence on bureaucracy.

Raadschelders states that "there is a growing need in public administration and political science for a better understanding of the past for the sake of the present and the future" (2003, 161). We would like our paper to be taken as a contribution to this line of argument. From a methodological perspective, we have shown that American scholars have not always approached public administration with the methodological individualism that dominates the current public administration research agenda. Especially at the end of the nineteenth century, holistic sociological and political conceptions were appreciated. We think that this has a lot to do with the transfer of knowledge from Germany to the United States. In addition, we believe that a trans-cultural hermeneutic approach as employed here can contribute to comparative administrative research. Comparative scholars naturally concentrate on dissimilarities among bureaucratic traditions rather than analogies (e.g., Chandler 2000; Heady 1996; Heper 1987; Rutgers 2000; Stillman 1997). Thus, they suggest that the German and the American path are very different. Although this interpretation is generally accurate, we can find that there are highly interesting junctions between the German and the American administrative paths by analyzing the mutual perception of theoreticians from both sides of the Atlantic. In general, quite many deviations of an administrative path may be understood if we pay attention to the contact of that path with another bureaucratic tradition. Hence, the trans-cultural approach is able to deal with change analytically. With regard to the German and the American administrative paths, it may be found that they are not *that* different after all.

Finally, finding that Wilson's work originates in normative German idealism may further our appreciation of the common ground of a general normative orientation of American administrative science, be it the original Progressive movement, the public choice school, or the neo-Progressive countermovement (Lowery 1999). This is not a trivial statement when we apply Spicer's cue regarding Hegel and Weber to Wilson, namely "that there are significant limits on our ability to draw theoretical generalizations from their [Weber's and Hegel's] ideas that are relevant to our own particular time and place. We may be able to gain important insights into the history of ideas from Hegel and Weber, but we cannot necessarily hope to find universally

applicable principles or theories" (2004a, 101). Given the normative grounds of U.S. administrative science, public administration concepts should be regarded as historical constructs and not universal solutions. Spicer states that "no matter how carefully we try, we cannot separate the political and social ideas expressed in our culture from our views on public administration" (2004b, 359). However, this often seems to be the case in the current employment of public administration concepts. A more historical or relativistic approach to public administration ideas might thus develop a less absolute perspective which is sensible to the plethora of concrete administrative problems. Wilson knew that the "philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, 'nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract thought'; and political philosophy, like philosophy of every other kind, has only held up the mirror to contemporary affairs" (1887, 199). Wilson's conclusion may not only apply to political philosophy in general, but also to public administration theory in particular.

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# Woodrow Wilson's Administrative Thought and German Political Theory[1]

Christian Rosser

*To what extent were Woodrow Wilson's ideas about public administration informed by German organic political theory? Drawing on the writings of Wilson, Lorenz von Stein, and Johann K. Bluntschli on public administration, and comparing American and German primary sources, the author offers insights into Wilson's general concept of public administration, as well as his understanding of the politics-administration dichotomy. With regard to current administrative research, this study underscores how the transfer of ideas profoundly contributes to advancing comparative public administration and helps clarify terminological difficulties and conflicting perspectives among diverse administrative science traditions.*

## Introduction

Several authors hold that an ahistorical perspective prevails in American Public Administration (Luton 1999, 210; Raadschelders 2003, 161; Raadschelders et al. 2000; Spicer 2004; Stillman 1997, 335).[2] Ahistorical reasoning may be the reason why American scholars have sometimes been reluctant to admit a certain debt to continental European sources (Lowery 1993; Miewald 1994). An analysis of Woodrow Wilson's writings and lecture notes on administration written at Johns Hopkins University between 1884 and 1897 may serve as a historical case study to exemplify how foreign experience gave direction to trends in American Public Administration.[3]

This essay concentrates on Wilson's transfer of German organic political philosophy. On the basis of a comparison of German and American primary sources,[4] it illustrates the influence that the German organic state theory - as a set of coherent implications - had as a guiding philosophy for Wilson's reflections on administration.

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[2] With regard to terminology, 'Public Administration' is used to refer to the study and 'public administration' to the practice.
[3] In 1884, Wilson was introduced to the academic subject of 'public administration'. Thirteen years later, he stopped lecturing on the subject at Johns Hopkins University.
[4] I would like to point out that all translations of German texts, and consequently all potential mistranslations, are my own.

With regard to the existing literature on Wilson's German intellectual inheritance, this essay may substantiate and sometimes even slightly modify the picture (e.g., Carrese 2005; Miewald 1984; Pestritto 2003, 2005, 2007; Spicer 2001, 40-49; Steigerwald 1989).[5] Most importantly, it will be argued that Wilson's complex ideas about the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government can be more readily understood if we interpret passages of Wilson's writings against the background of his German sources. Wilson's apparently ambiguous position regarding the politics-administration dichotomy has sparked controversy in the literature and does not seem to have lost its relevance (e.g., Hoffman 2002; Lynn 2001; Ostrom and Ostrom 1971; Overeem 2005; Rosenbloom 2008; Svara 2001; Van Riper 1984; Walker 1989).

The benefits of such a case study for today's Public Administration are twofold. On the one hand, the close examination of how foreign concepts are adopted to serve domestic needs helps clarify conflicting perspectives among different intellectual traditions and may help clarify terminological difficulties (Rutgers 2001b, 238-39; Stillman 1997, 337). On the other hand, the transfer of ideas approach may contribute to comparative research by furthering our understanding of the historical adequacy of 'traditional flavors' in Western administrative thought (Rutgers 2001b). Moreover, whereas comparative scholars have to comprehend ideational change by referring to 'critical junctures' or incremental change (Schmidt 2008), the transfer of ideas approach is able to deal analytically with change. It embraces transformations of one intellectual tradition as a consequence of an exchange with another tradition.

This paper is organized into four sections. As it is debatable in the history of ideas as to whether a certain author could have been influenced intellectually by some specific sources, the first section encompasses a discussion of the transfer of ideas approach, the method that is used in this paper. For the sake of analytical clarity, it is best to approach the transfer of ideas with clear-cut units of investigation. In a heuristic sense, it therefore will be essential to compare and contrast the American and German intellectual traditions of the nineteenth century. The second section is dedicated to Wilson's ideational context at Johns Hopkins University. On the basis of a comparison of Wilson's writings on administration with Lorenz von Stein's and Johann K. Bluntschli's publications on the subject, the third section examines Wil-

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[5] Several authors have discussed Wilson's British (e.g., Karl 1976; Rohr 1986, 69–75; Stillman 1973) and French (Martin 1987) intellectual background.

son's adaptation of German organicism to domestic needs. The concluding section discusses the potential benefits of the transfer of ideas approach in greater detail.

## American Individualism versus German Organicism

The transfer of ideas is defined as the (intentional) movement of scholarly discourses and concepts between two intellectual traditions (Osterhammel 2003). It is characterized by three processes: mediation, selection, and reception (Lüsebrink 2001, 215-17). First, mediation processes have to do with the actors who transfer and the institutions that allow for the transfer. Contextual factors of the relevant scholarly discourse are important. Accordingly, the intellectual environment in which a scholar works should be discussed. Second, selection processes have to do with the texts and scholarly discourses that are chosen to be transferred from one ideational context to the other. Finally, and most importantly, reception processes have to do with the embedding of the transferred texts and scholarly discourses in the context of the recipient intellectual tradition. With regard to selection and reception processes, the transfer of ideas approach attaches high importance to the individual's creative power. Here, the explanatory logic of the approach is as follows: When scholars reflecting on their explanations of reality are confronted with inconsistencies, they investigate foreign traditions to solve their intellectual dilemmas (Bevir 2002). Hence, the guiding assumption for conducting research on the transfer of ideas is that authors rely on foreign sources in order to improve their intellectual inheritance.

For the sake of analytical clarity, a distinction should be drawn between the 'sending' and recipient intellectual traditions because, metaphorically speaking, this permits us to analyze the journey of intellectual concepts from their place of departure to their destination (Werner and Zimmermann 2006, 46). In the sense of heuristic abstractions, it is therefore appropriate to conceive of the American and German intellectual traditions of the nineteenth century as clearly distinct ideational paths, or, to put it in Rutgers's (2001b) words, as distinct "traditional flavors." With regard to the transfer of organic concepts from Germany to the United States, it makes sense to contrast the American 'stateless' with the German 'stateness' tradition (Rutgers 2001b; Stillman 1990, 1997).

During the early nineteenth century, the social compact theories of Montesquieu and Locke exerted the most significant influence on America's political thought (Lutz 1984; Pestritto 2007, 19). Government was conceptualized as a rational construct based on premises such as individual liberty, equality, and property. As these prem-

ises imply, the political order was understood as irrevocable, and thus could not be subject to historical changes. Americans traditionally regarded the protection of individual freedom as the main reason for political organization. In Spicer's words, the preferred American form of organization may be labeled as a civil association "in which men and women see themselves as free to pursue their own particular interests and values. What binds them together as a political group is not any common set of substantive ends or objectives, but their common recognition or acknowledgement of certain rules of conduct" (2004, 356). Accordingly, Americans did not conceive of the state as some kind of guardian of the common will (Rutgers 2001b, 230).

The state was identified with government based on and bound to constitutional principles, and it was supposed to intervene only as much as was needed to guarantee the American citizen's rights. Among the constitutional principles, especially high importance was attached to the separation of powers doctrine. It was believed that the three branches of government would check and balance each other in order to prevent one power from becoming dominant (Pestritto 2007, 18; Rutgers 2000, 291). Because of the limited government tradition and the strict adherence to constitutional principles, Americans did not consider the administration of society an integral part of the state. As bureaucracy was seen as a threat to liberty, the aim was to operate without a *public* administration.

In nineteenth-century Germany, the preferred form of political organization may be labeled as purposive association "in which individuals recognize themselves as united or bound together for the joint pursuit of some coherent set of substantive purposes or ends" - Spicer's terminology again (2004, 355). In line with the political philosophy of Hegel, German scholars frequently drew analogies between the state and living organisms in order to portray the state as a purposive association (Böckenförde 1978, 584-86).[6] In his *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel (1995, §267, §269) pictured the state as an organic, souled being in which all parts formed a system of complete interdependence. The analogy illustrated the development of the state as

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[6] In nineteenth-century Germany, various versions of organic political theory existed. I focus the discussion of the analogy's implications on Hegel, Stein, and Bluntschli, because it was Stein who brought Hegel's notion of bureaucracy to the United States, and because Bluntschli's private library, containing more than 3,000 books and manuscripts, was donated to Johns Hopkins University in the early 1880s (Adams 1885, 122; Rutgers 1994; Miewald 1984). In addition, contemporary scholars may object that Hegel's organicism has little to do with understanding the state as a 'natural' body. His organicism should rather be linked with individual and collective self-determination and rationality (e.g., Neuhouser 2000). However, as it is the aim of this paragraph to illustrate how scholars of the late nineteenth century interpreted Hegel, a traditional reading of Hegel seems appropriate.

a dialectical, rational process toward the institution of collective freedom. As members of the rational state, individuals would recognize that they were part of a complete and thus free community. Hegel (1995, §257) explicitly maintained that the "state is the actuality of the ethical idea." As a vital organ of the whole organism, bureaucracy was considered an integral part and thus a necessary and legitimate consequence of the state's development. With regard to the promotion of both individual *and* public welfare, Hegel attached a great deal of importance to public administration (Sager and Rosser 2009).

Bluntschli appreciated Hegel's treatment of the state's evolution as well as his emphasis on the ethical significance of the state (Bluntschli 1875, 79). He pictured the state as the actual embodiment of the people when he wrote that "the state is by no means a lifeless instrument, a dead machine but a living and therefore organic entity" (1881, 757). As the organic notion implies, he claimed that the development of the modern state should no longer be based on inadequate, 'mechanic' social contract theories. In that context, Bluntschli declared that "as the human being is not merely an amount of blood corpuscles and cells, a nation is not simply a sum of citizens" (1875, 18). Rather, historical explanations should trace the purposive state back to the nation's intrinsic desire for the commonweal. Like Hegel, Bluntschli saw the establishment of an expansive public administration as a necessary step toward the actualization of the common good.

Stein applied the Hegelian dialectic to systematize his administrative theory (Rutgers 1994, 398). He aimed at a systematic substantiation of the organic analogy when he interpreted the state as an abstract personality. Whereas he pictured the sovereign as the self-conscious 'self' (*Ich*),[7] he saw the state's will (*Wille*) manifested in the constitution/legislation, and its deed (*Tat*) realized in the administration (Stein 1869, 3-12). He believed, on the one hand, that once the state had developed to its complete form, the administration - determined by the state's conscience - would implement the public interest. On the other hand, he stressed the importance of self-government, or, in other words, the citizen's duty to exercise personal responsibility as a means for individual self-fulfillment. For Stein, both the realization of collective and individual freedom were thus to be achieved under the all-embracing umbrella of the organic state.

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[7] It should be noted that Stein favored a constitutional monarchy in which the head of state would participate in both the legislative process as well as in government (Böckenförde 1978, 608; Miewald 1984, 20).

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the idea of the state as the actual embodiment of the people had an impact on moderate liberal scholars of political science and public law that can hardly be overestimated (Lindenfeld 1997, 176-80). The organism characterized the relationship between the state, the whole society, and every individual's liberty as a purposive arrangement to which neither revolutions nor overpowering governments could pose a threat (Böckenförde 1978, 601; Stolleis 1992, 264). Public administration was considered the guardian of the common will. Furthermore, the organic notion implied that only historical analyses could offer comprehensive understanding of reality. In preliminary conclusion, it can be stated that in this intellectual tradition, society was "held together not by contract and self-interest, but by a corporate identity and common purpose that far transcended the private satisfaction of individual members" (Harris 1998, 149). While it has been the intention of this section to draw a heuristic distinction between the American and German intellectual traditions, the next section will discuss how these traditions converged in the late nineteenth century.

**Organic Political Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University**

It hardly seems to be an exaggeration to say that during the closing years of the nineteenth century, the whole of American political science - of which Public Administration cannot be separated at this time - was under great influence of German political theory (e.g., Adcock 2006; Gunnell 1995; Herbst 1965; Hoffman 2002; Pestritto 2005, 84-92). Thousands of students left the United States for a few semesters to enroll in German universities. They probably did so because German academic titles promised a competitive advantage in the academic job market at home. The comparative ease with which a doctorate could be attained in Germany and the international reputation of German philosophers, law professors, and historians may have served as additional incentives.

Moreover, political developments may have convinced them to study abroad (Herbst 1965, 10). In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, social and industrial problems led to a remarkable increase in public spending on both continents (Luton 2003, 171-72; Schieder 1984). More than in Central European countries, however, corruption generated enormous costs to the economy in America (Wallis 2006). New businesses, administrative positions, or, quite simply, money were offered in exchange for political support. Opening hours and regulations of gambling houses and brothels benefitted from arbitrary interpretations of the law

(Glaeser and Goldin 2006, 7). In dubious ways, private firms obtained attractive properties, easy access to the harbor, or extortionate payments for their services (Putnam 2000, 374). In a nutshell, the corrupt procedures allowed businessmen, politicians, and civil servants to get rich, reelected, or promoted (Menes 2006, 85-86). In order to develop strategies against corruption, reform-oriented scholars traveled across the Atlantic to learn about the German way of dealing with public policies.

Several of Wilson's teachers were among the students who went to Germany. George Morris, for example, had been brought up within the Hegelian doctrine in Halle and Berlin. He frequently referred to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right,* which he "regarded as representing the high-water mark […] in the treatment of the philo-sophical conception of the state" (Morris 1885, 163). To those students who were not able to read in German, he recommended Elisha Mulford's *Nation* (Morris 1885, 164). In Halle and Heidelberg, Mulford had also learned to write "with an obligation […] to Hegel" (1881, 7-8). The close connection between Mulford's *Nation* and Hegelian political philosophy may be exemplified with the following quotation: "The nation […] is a moral organism, it is formed of persons in the relations in which there is the realization of personality, it is not limited to the necessary sequence of a physical development, but transcends a merely physical condition, and in it there is the realization of freedom and the manifestation of rights" (Mulford 1881, 382).[8] For Mulford, laissez-faire liberalism in the United States posed a dilemma. He was con-vinced that the common good was more than the sum of individual goods and that the public spirit seeking the common good was represented in the organic state.

Pestritto (2005, 82; cf. Miewald 1984, 27), who has written extensively on Wilson's German intellectual background, sees a close connection between Hegel's and Wilson's political thought. With regard to Wilson's writings on administration, how-ever, it is difficult to appraise the direct influence that Hegel may have exerted on Wilson. Although the *Philosophy of Right* appears repeatedly in Wilson's working bibliographies (Link 1969a, 586-87; 1970a, 129), he quoted Hegel no more than twice, first in a love letter to his wife (Link 1968a, 317), and later in his famous es-say "The Study of Administration" (1887). In the latter, he emphasized the need for a new science of administration with a Hegelian statement: "The philosophy of any time is, as Hegel says, 'nothing but the spirit of that time expressed in abstract

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[8] Mulford (1881, 8) used the terms 'nation' and 'state' synonymously.

thought'; and political philosophy, like philosophy of every other kind, has only held up the mirror to contemporary affairs" (Link 1968b, 361). Even if we doubt whether Wilson studied Hegel's books, we can assume that the Hegelian notion of the state was presented to Wilson via Morris and Mulford. Between 1884 and 1885, Wilson attended Morris's course on the philosophy of the state (Link 1968a, 335). When, one year later, he thought about how to "study government," he acknowledged that Mulford's *Nation* was going to furnish him with "with inspiration and philosophy" (Link 1968b, 303). Hence, Pestritto seems safe if he finds more than accidental convergences between Hegel's and Wilson's writings.

Another German-trained professor at Johns Hopkins University was Herbert Adams. He had studied in Heidelberg, where he had completed his doctorate under Bluntschli (Fries 1973, 394). It is therefore not surprising that during Adams's courses, the history of the United States was recapitulated with the help of organic metaphors (e.g., Adams 1885, 126). Moreover, in agreement with most of his German colleagues, Adams advocated "the application of the comparative method to the use of historical literature" (1885, 138). Adams's views and methods seem to have appealed to Wilson. Several scholars hold that Adams was an essential source of inspiration for Wilson's early political science (Cunningham 1981, 261; Raadschelders 2002, 581; Stillman 1973, 582-83). Accordingly, he wrote in the introduction to *The State* that the "only thorough method of study in politics is the comparative and historical" (Wilson 1892, 597; cf. Link 1969b, 116).

Finally, attention should be drawn to Richard Ely, who introduced Wilson to the subject of public administration in 1884. Ely, who had studied philosophy and economy in Halle, Heidelberg, and Berlin, was probably the most important source of inspiration for Wilson's reflections on administration (Link 1968b, 43). As will become clear in the subsequent section, Ely may have paraphrased a statement from Stein when he wrote that the main social problem of the late nineteenth century was not "one of legislation but fundamentally one of administration" (1938, 114). He thought that public ownership managed by responsible civil servants offered a remedy against the corrupt practices prevalent in U.S. politics (Ely 1888, 50). For instance, he stated that the "natural monopolies are those with which we are especially concerned at the present time, and here the general rule is public ownership and management" (1899, 261). Ely was apparently less skeptical of state interventionism than many of his compatriots.

It has been argued thus far that the academic discourse at Johns Hopkins University was influenced by German political theory, sharing its centrality of the state and its organic notion of the state, its use of the comparative-historical approach against methodological individualism, and its critique of laissez-faire economics and political corruption. According to Link, Wilson absorbed his German-trained teachers' "emphasis upon the origins and organic evolutionary development of institutions" (1968b, 55). For example, Wilson replied to the question about the nature of government: "The answer is hidden in the nature of society itself. Society is in no sense artificial; it is as truly natural and organic as the individual man himself. […] Society, therefore, is […] an evolution of experience, an interlaced growth of tenacious relationships, a compact, living, organic whole, structural, not mechanical" (1892, 597). While it may have become clear that the organic outlook was an important aspect of Wilson's ideational context, nothing has hitherto been said about *how* this outlook may have inspired Wilson to respond to the intellectual dilemmas of his time.

**Wilson and the German Study of Public Administration**

The analysis of Wilson's reliance on German sources helps clarify his vision of the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government. At the heart of Wilson's ideas about the subject lies his historical notion of the state (Pestritto 2005, 227). Wilson differentiated between the 'era of constitution' and the 'era of administration' as two distinct stages in the organic growth of the state. In an early "Essay on Administration" (1885), Wilson noted that the "period of constitution-making is passed now. We have reached new territory in which we need new guides, the vast territory of administration. All the enlightened world has come along with us into these new fields, and much of the enlightened world has realized the fact and is preparing itself to understand administration" (Link 1968b, 52). Here the American quite clearly paraphrased an introductory passage from Stein's *Handbuch der Verwaltungslehre* (1870, 3), where he had read that if the whole living state and its organic elements were to be understood, one should no longer concentrate on the constitution-making process but rather on the examination of public administration. It was this historical notion of the state that led Wilson to the conclusion, "It is getting to be harder to *run* a constitution than to frame one" (Link 1968b, 362). Apparently, Wilson envisioned an expansive public administration as the means to run the constitution.

Wilson's distinction between the constitution-making process and administration was not an attempt to declare constitutional questions obsolete for the 'era of administration'. As Rohr states, it seems more likely that "throughout his life, Wilson was an enthusiastic constitutionalist" (1986, 60). However, Wilson did not agree with the traditional American idea about the constitution as a static set of principles to ensure strictly limited government. This can be seen in Wilson's rejection of the separation of powers doctrine. He contended that the Americans had followed Montesquieu as "excessively practical people" instead of following him as "philosophers" (Link 1968b, 51). He argued that even if the separation of powers doctrine had been adequate for the period of constitution making, it was no longer consistent with the present situation. He wrote, "The object sought is, not the effectuation of a system of mechanical, or artificial, checks and balances, but only the facilitation and promotion of organic differentiation" (Link 1969b, 142). According to Wilson, "Montesquieu did not hit upon exactly the right devices for practical popular government. When he said that it was essential for the preservation of liberty to differentiate the executive, legislative and judicial functions of government, he was thinking of an undemocratic state in which the executive ruled for life by hereditary right and not be virtue of popular election [...]. And he did not say that it was essential to liberty to separate, to *isolate,* these three functions of government" (Link 1968b, 51). Wilson lamented that government could not intervene according to the contemporary needs of American society because of the strict adherence to constitutional principles. Explicitly, Wilson stated, "Under our own system we have isolation plus irresponsibility, - isolation and therefore irresponsibility. At this point more widely than at any other our government differs from the other governments of the world. Other Executives lead, ours obeys" (1892, 592).

Wilson may have found inspiration in Bluntschli's writings on administration to argue against the separation of powers doctrine. Bluntschli (1875, 76) considered it to the historical school's credit to have brought the organic character of the state back to the scene. Historical reasoning had shown that the *trias politica* was "neither logically correct, nor appropriate to actual conditions" (Bluntschli 1881, 306). Bluntschli (1875, 589) thought Montesquieu's trichotomy to be analytically helpful, but only if it was not interpreted too mechanically. He did not advocate a limitation of the executive's power in the sense of the American checks and balances. For him, the executive was related to the other powers in the same way that the head was related to

the limbs of the body (Bluntschli 1875, 594). Only an expansive bureaucracy could execute the will of the state and thus promote the welfare of society.

In line with the German intellectual tradition, Wilson wanted the constitutional state to be defined as an organic whole in which the constitution formed "the skeleton frame of a living organism" (Rohr 1986, 63). Accordingly, Wilson interpreted the constitution as a set of general guidelines rather than an irrevocable set of written principles. Cook states that Wilson aimed at an "ambitious reinterpretation of the constitutional order" that included an "expansion of federal government responsibility and action with advances on social policy and political-economic policy, and changes in the executive organization of government and the operation of administrative systems" (2006, 328-29). Wilson was convinced that an expansive public administration could be established without giving up the constitutional values of liberty, property, and equality. He believed that a high-profile public administration had become "the most influential sort of government activity" to achieve the fundamental American ideals (Rohr 1986, 66; cf. Miewald 1984, 24-26).

Building on his historical concept of the state, Wilson distinguished between lawgiving and administrative functions of the state. In order to do so, he repeatedly drew on German sources. In "The Study of Administration," for example, Wilson explicitly referred to page 467 of Bluntschli's *Politik* when he wrote, "Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. […] Bluntschli, for instance, bids us separate administration alike from politics and from law. Politics, he says, is state activity 'in things great and universal,' while 'administration, on the other hand,' is 'activity of the state in individual and small things.' 'Policy does nothing without the aid of administration;' but administration is not therefore politics. But we do not require German authority for this position; this discrimination between administration and politics is now, happily, too obvious to need further discussion" (Link 1968b, 371). Considering the controversy about the exact meaning of Wilson's position on the proper relationship between political and administrative aspects of government, which followed in the Public Administration literature, we may have good reason to disagree with Wilson on that point and reevaluate Bluntschli's discrimination.

In his textbooks, Bluntschli (1876, 465) analyzed the proper role of the state's functions with the help of dichotomies. He formulated the terminological oppositions 'constitution vs. administration', 'legislation vs. administration', and 'politics vs. ad-

ministration' (1876, 467). We can assume that Wilson had not only read one paragraph of Bluntschli's textbook but also the subsequent ones. If we follow suit with him, we discover that Bluntschli discussed Stein's distinction between will and deed and (inaccurately) concluded that it was inappropriate to "parallelize administration and legislation with deed and will as if the administration had no will of its own" (1876, 467). By contradicting Stein, he in the same breath underlined the political function of the administration. Accordingly, Bluntschli wrote that "many administrative acts have - if they bear a meaning for the whole nation - political character. The statesman will leave innumerable affairs to the administration without paying further attention to it" (1876, 467). Against the background of these citations, it becomes clear that Bluntschli formulated his terminological oppositions in order to define the leading part he wanted public administration to play in high politics.

Wilson's and Bluntschli's interpretations of Stein's distinction between will and deed reveal striking similarities. In "The Study of Administration," Wilson argued that the "distinction between Will and answering Deed" did not apply to the American context. Rather, a distinction had to be made between "general plans and special means" (Link 1968b, 372). The American administrator was supposed to have "a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work" (Link 1968b, 372). Of the same tenor, Wilson stated that the public servant "is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument." Apparently, Wilson agreed with Bluntschli and disagreed with Stein in order to emphasize the political role of public administration.

While in 1887, Wilson seems to have found an inappropriate "justification for an apolitical administration" in Stein's textbook, he later revised his opinion (Miewald 1984, 21). In his "Notes on Administration" (1891), he reproduced Stein's differentiation between will and deed as an analytical distinction (Link 1969b, 115). With regard to the difference between law-giving and administrative functions of the state, he noted that the "theory really predicates a division of organs, based upon a difference of a radical sort in the functions [but] in practice, there has been no sharp differentiation of organs to correspond to the full with these differences of function. The object of actual developments [is] not a system of mechanical checks and balances, but simply organic differentiation [...] no part overworked, but each skilled and instructed by specialization; each part coördinated with and assisted by all others; each part an organ, not to serve a separate interest, but to serve the whole" (Link 1969b, 383). In agreement with Stein's theory (1870, 9), Wilson pictured the administration as a vital organ of the state that was in no sense subordinate to the

legislation, but rather had to compensate for the gradual pace of legislation. Both Stein and Wilson thought that the administration could not wait for the legislature to enforce the state's will. Accordingly, he maintained that "law is always a summing up of the past. […] Administration, on the other hand, is always in contact with the present: it is the State's experiencing organ. It is thus that it becomes a source of law" (Link 1969b, 138). For the German as well as the American, both legislative and administrative processes had to do with the "active promotion of the ends of the state" (Link 1969b, 115). It thus becomes apparent that Wilson did not advocate an apolitical public administration. Rather, Wilson's reading of Stein may have convinced him that the future administration had to be a source of law, or, in other words, a political organ with far-reaching competences.

Wilson referred to Stein in his 1894 lecture on public law in order to provide his students with a state theory he thought appropriate for American circumstances. After his overview of inaccurate state theories, Wilson concluded, "[W]e have adopted the theory of the 'Constitutional State.' This involves an 'organic' conception of the nature of the State. Every State is the historical form of the organic common life of a particular people, some form of the organic political life being in every instance commanded by the very nature of man. The State is an abiding natural relationship. It is neither a mere convenience nor a mere necessity: neither a merely voluntary association, nor a mere corporation, nor any other artificial thing, created for a special purpose; but the eternal and natural embodiment and expression of a form of life higher than that of the individual: that common life wh. gives leave and opportunity to individual life, makes it possible and makes it full and complete" (Link 1970b, 13). When he talked about the "organs of the state and its means of action," he relied on Stein to define administration: "The Nature of Administration […] is the continuous and systematic carrying out in practice of all the tasks which devolve upon the State […]. It deals directly, indeed, and principally with the structural features and the operative organs of state life; […] 'Die Idee des Staates ist das Gewissen der Verwaltung' (Stein)" (Link 1970b, 28-29; cf. 1968b, 363; 1969b, 124). Clearly, Wilson agreed with Stein in regard to the political significance of public administration.

When Wilson envisaged a science-based, hierarchically organized, formalized, and meritocratic public administration, he pictured concrete organizational aspects that were close to the concepts of Hegel and Bluntschli (1875, 601-27; cf. Sager and Rosser 2009). Wilson thought that the thorough training of the administrative elite

would lead to a body of altruistic, dutiful public servants. The remarkable confidence in public administrators may have stoked fears of many Americans who traditionally opposed top-down political organization. Wilson seems to have been aware of that when he stated, "I know that a corps of civil servants prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline, seems to a great many very thoughtful persons to contain elements which might combine to make an offensive official class, - a distinct, semi-corporate body with sympathies divorced from those of progressive, free-spirited people, and with hearts narrowed to the meanness of bigoted officialism" (Link 1968b, 375). However, then he continued by saying that there "is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. [...] if it be centered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the service, it is easily watched and brought to book." Wilson apparently believed that a hierarchically organized and professionalized public service would deal altruistically with public life (Link 1968b, 375-76).

Wilson was interested in what Bluntschli and Stein had to say about the organic state in general and public administration in particular, because he was confronted with a dilemma and, as a consequence, interested in change. Wilson believed that an expansive administration would save the people from the destructive influence of egoistic individualism, which he thought was prevalent in U.S. politics. This egoistic individualism had led to the most painful thorn in Wilson's side: corruption. In fact, "Wilson's vision of a greatly enlarged role for government in national governance [was] based on his belief that politics had become almost hopelessly corrupt and impure" (Pestritto 2005, 222; cf. Cook 2006, 336). In "The Study of Administration," for example, he lamented the "crooked state of administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington" (Link 1968b, 363). He believed that thoroughly educated public servants would not be susceptible to corruption. He was convinced that the administration would serve as the guardian of the common will and the promoter of public welfare. In that sense, in order to take "politics out of administration" (Overeem 2005, 317), Wilson formulated a normative politics-administration dichotomy.

Rohr (1986) interprets Wilson's trust in the power of an 'enlightened' administration as an expression of his conservative view of democracy and attributes Wilson's conservatism to the organic political philosophy of Bagehot and Burke (Rohr 1986, 69). Rohr argues that Wilson shared with the framers of the constitution the fear of the "tyranny of the masses," but he did not envision the same means to remedy this

dilemma. Rohr (1986, 74) explains that whereas the founders had seen the means to save "democracy from its own excesses" in the separation of powers, Wilson aimed at a strict separation of politics and "enlightened" administration instead. Pestritto disagrees with Rohr's interpretation and finds no continuity between the framers' and Wilson's ideas about the subject. He argues that "Wilson placed administrative power on an entirely different plane from constitutional power, and it is the sharp distinction between constitutional politics and administrative discretion that separates Wilson from those earlier thinkers […] who had also placed great importance on national administration" (Pestritto 2005, 237). He concludes that "Wilson's apparent conservative organicism is not nearly as important as his progressive idealism. Or, to put it another way, his affinity for Burke gives way to his devotion to Hegelian political philosophy" (Pestritto 2005, 223).

Wilson's reliance on German organicism seems to indicate that he should not be interpreted as a conservative, but rather as a progressive intellectual. What distinguishes him from the intellectual tradition of his forefathers is his definition of society. For Wilson, society was not merely a conglomerate of individuals in the sense of a civil association, but rather a purposive association in which "the individual was really an indistinguishable part of a larger community" (Pestritto 2003, 555). Wilson's organic account of the state implies that he believed Americans would recognize themselves as bound together for the joint pursuit of the common good. Wilson thought his contemporaries would understand that the realization of the common good was inextricably linked with public administration. Like Hegel, Bluntschli, and Stein, he saw no contradiction in advocating a highly influential administration in the same breath as an administration subordinate to the people. In this vein, he noted several times that "[a]dministration […] sees government in contact with the people. It rests its whole front along the line which is drawn in each State between Interference and Laissez faire. It thus touches, directly or indirectly, the whole practical side of social endeavour" (Link 1969b, 116; cf. 1968b, 373; 1970a, 411; 1970b, 29). Hence, it seems appropriate to concur with Pestritto's conclusion about Wilson's optimistic progressivism. However, as has been argued before, it does not follow from this that Wilson drew a sharp distinction between constitutional and administrative aspects of government. On the contrary, he did not intend to draw a dividing line between 'constitution' and 'administration,' because he interpreted the American constitution as a set of general guidelines that were subject to historical change.

Miewald argues that during Wilson's academic career, Wilson could only arrive at a coherent theory on public administration "by resorting to the highest levels of abstraction," or, to put it differently, by increasingly relying "upon the organic theory of the state" (1984, 23; cf. 26). Considering the essential role that organic political theory played in both Wilson's intellectual context at Johns Hopkins University and his writings on administration, it is debatable whether Wilson resorted to the organic accounts of Bluntschli and Stein, or whether their theories provided Wilson with a starting point. On the whole, however, this case study substantiates Miewald's interpretation of Wilson's reliance on German organicism. Arguably, it was German organic political theory that provided Wilson with a coherent set of implications from which he could deduce concrete aspects of administration. The "concept of the organic state was not a mere academic conceit" for Wilson (Miewald 1984, 22). Instead, he understood the state quite literally as a living organism.

**Conclusion and Outlook**

To claim that Wilson was *determined* by German sources would be an unsustainable exaggeration. However, as this comparison of Wilson's work on administration with passages from Stein's and Bluntschli's writings has shown, he was eagerly interested in what the Germans had to say about public administration. Most importantly, it has been argued that the organic theories of Bluntschli and Stein informed Wilson's ideas about the proper relationship between the political and administrative aspects of government.

With regard to high politics, reading German organic political theories may have inspired Wilson to contrast 'constitution' with 'administration' as well as 'legislation' with 'administration'. By distinguishing between the constitutional and administrative aspects of government, Wilson aimed to demonstrate that the state was subject to historical change. He believed that constitutional principles such as the *trias politica* should no longer be interpreted as an irrevocable set of premises, but as general guidelines for government activity. According to Wilson, the time had come for public administration to translate these guidelines into concrete actions. Similarly, in order to distinguish between general plans and special means, he contrasted legislation and administration. Wilson saw in public administration the means to compensate for the gradual pace of legislation. He thought that a body of altruistic, dutiful public servants would promote the common good of society, which he believed had primacy over the good of the individual. Public administration had to be

protected from the influence of egoistic individualism and corrupt politics. In that sense, in order to take politics out of administration, Wilson formulated a prescriptive politics-administration dichotomy.

With regard to current research, Rutgers (2001a) shows how important and nevertheless problematic dichotomies are for Public Administration. This case study has provided evidence of the several dimensions contained within the politics-administration dichotomy. For the sake of analytical clarity, we should distinguish between the analytical, the substantial, and the normative meanings of the concept. With regard to the last, it should be considered whether scholars have separated the two spheres to protect administration from political influence or to insulate democracy from an over-whelming bureaucracy (Overeem 2005). In terms of an outlook, this case study may exemplify how primary source-based examinations of reciprocal receptions of American and European scholars may further our search for common terminological ground on both sides of the Atlantic. The transfer of ideas approach may contribute to the clarification of polysemous meanings of and terminological difficulties within administrative concepts and may put them into perspective.

In addition, comparative Public Administration may benefit from the transfer of ideas approach. Comparative scholars usually concentrate on differences between bureaucratic paths rather than on similarities and reciprocal inspirations. As a consequence, they suggest that continental European and American administrative developments have proceeded separately and continue to do so. According to Werner and Zimmermann, "in the case of the comparative method, where the deductive aspect is often significant, national issues, pre-existing and crystallized in a language and in specific categories of analysis, pose a risk of partly prefiguring the results" (2006, 46). Rutgers's (2001b) article on the different sentiments in European and American administrative thought, which has provoked reactions from high-profile administrative scholars such as Stillman (2001) and Rohr (2001), shows that it makes sense to contrast the Anglo-American stateless tradition with the continental European tradition, where the state has always figured as the center for administrative research. Rutgers concludes, however, that the two traditions are largely ideal-typical constructions. The transfer of ideas approach takes such elaborated, clear-cut units of investigation - diametrically opposed administrative traditions - as a starting point. Hence, the transfer approach does not claim to "escape the weight of such pre-established national formatting, but its inductive orientation aims to limit

effects through an investigative mechanism in which the objects, categories, and analytical schemes are adjusted in the course of research" (Werner and Zimmermann 2006, 46). By analyzing how contact between two administrative paths results in their deviation, the inductive orientation of the transfer of ideas approach may clarify in what respect intellectual traditions are historically adequate descriptions and in what respect they prove to be ideal-typical constructions.

Finally, if comparative scholars conceptualize administrative paths as isolated and autonomous, they must comprehend ideational change by referring to 'critical junctures' as periods of significant change, or, alternatively, they will have to continue merely describing incremental change. The transfer of ideas approach also takes 'critical junctures' into account. However, it additionally conceptualizes 'change' as a result of mutual inspiration and fertilization. Metaphorically speaking, it may help set rather static national traditions in motion. On the whole, the transfer of ideas approach should not be regarded as an alternative to comparative Public Administration, but as a complementary tool to assess the findings of comparative research.

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# Weber Reloaded: How Was Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy Received in the Organizational and the Political Approach to U.S. Public Administration?

Christian Rosser

*Drawing on a bibliometric overview of influential American books on public administration, this paper provides a comparative textual analysis of how Max Weber's work on bureaucracy was received among administrative scholars with a background in political science, on one hand, and scholars with an organizational orientation on the other. From both a methodological and substantial perspective, organizational scholars took a much stronger interest in Weber's ideal typical bureaucracy. Weber's historical account of the rise of bureaucracy, however, has not only generated interest in organizational literature, but also in political-administrative literature. By both organizational and political scholars, Weber's portrayal of the dynamics and structural characteristics of bureaucracy was generally (mis)interpreted either as an empirical description of, or a normative prescription for efficient and effective administration. Considering the recent rediscovery of Weberian bureaucracy in administrative scholarship, this study underscores how important it is to be aware of past misunderstandings of Weber's work.*

## Introduction

This paper compares the 20th century-reception of Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy in the organizational theory approach and the political science approach to U.S. Public Administration.[1] While it has been convincingly argued that Weber's work impacted the advancement of the American social sciences, in general (e.g. Scaff 2011; 2004; Beetham 2006; Gerhardt 2006; Erdelyi 1992; Roth 1992), comparatively less effort has been devoted to examining the influence his writings exerted on U.S. Public Administration in particular. There is a general concurrence among authors who have concerned themselves with this matter that Weber's writings attracted the greatest attention in the literature dealing with bureaucracy as an organizational phenomenon (e.g. Gajduschek 2003; Derlien 1999; Leivesley et al.

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[1] Upper case letters are used in this paper to refer to the scientific discipline 'Public Administration', whereas lower case letters are used to refer to the practice. Considering the inductive and explorative nature of this study, it seems sensible to conceive of reception broadly in the sense of a mental approval or disapproval and explicit use of Weberian ideas on bureaucracy (for a more detailed discussion, see Sager et al. 2011).

1994, 42-49; Mayntz 1965). In this context, Raadschelders (2000, 112) explains that "few concepts in the socio-scientific approach of public organization have received so much attention, met with so much misinterpretation, and thus met with so much (unfounded) criticism as Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy and the context of his theory about the development toward a legal-rational society." Gajduschek (2003) and Derlien (1999) hold that the ideal type of bureaucracy was widely interpreted as a prescriptive model for efficient organization. They observe that by identifying bureaucratic dysfunctions and exposing the inefficiency of bureaucratic organizations, much of the organizational literature claimed falsification of the ideal type and, as a consequence, Weber's alleged efficiency thesis.

Beetham (1985, 2) discovers "a curious paradox about the reception of Weber's work in Anglo-American social science since the Second World War. His profound impact upon the discipline of sociology has been paralleled by a relative neglect within political science." Gajduschek (2003, 706) argues that political scientists at least implicitly criticized Weber for having mistakenly pictured bureaucracy as the most efficient form of administration. This argument seems plausible if we consider Rosenbloom's (1983) seminal article which introduced the managerial, the political, and the legal approach as the three foundations of U.S. Public Administration. Rosenbloom (1983, 220) writes that the managerial approach promoted "organization essentially along the lines of Max Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy." He adds that in the aftermath of World War II, political scientists started to criticize the adherents of the managerial approach (e.g. Gulick/Urwick 1937; Taylor 1911) for their heavy emphasis upon administrative efficiency. It was claimed that instead of concentrating on the issue of efficiency, future research had to include an extensive discussion of values like responsibility, representativeness, and accountability (Holzer et al. 2007, 68-73; Rosenbloom 1983, 219-222). In view of this observation, it may be assumed that Gajduschek's (2003) conclusion is correct. However, his study fails to provide convincing empirical evidence in favor of this verdict, because it does not explain whether or how the political literature made an explicit use of Weber's writings.

These opening statements suggest that while Weber's reception among organizational theorists has been investigated to some degree, hardly anything is known about the reception of his work among political scholars. To fill this gap, we compare the reception of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as reflected in organizational literature with its reception as mirrored in political literature on public admin-

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istration. Specifically, two questions are addressed: (1) is it possible to find evidence for a substantial reception of Weber's account of bureaucracy within political literature? (2) If there is evidence, does the textual analysis of this literature show a more selective focus on Weber's so-called efficiency thesis than what is observable in organizational literature?

In trying to answer these questions, this article proceeds as follows: First, we address the challenges of selecting, classifying, and quantitatively estimating a sufficiently comprehensive body of sources, from which one may draw sound inferences on the topic at hand (cf. Bowen/Bowen 2008). It is argued that a simple bibliometric analysis of widely read American books provides a surrogate measure of the relative reception of Weber's writings within organizational theory and the political science approach to Public Administration (cf. Lounsbury/Carberry 2005; Lutz 1984). In the second section, the ideal type of bureaucracy is reconstructed in the context of Weber's epistemological, historical, and sociological reflections. This reconstruction aims to provide a reliable background for the third section, in which we explore and compare the actual reception of Weber's concept of bureaucracy within organizational and political literature. In the last section, we attempt to synthesize the findings with regard to the implications Weber's portrayal of bureaucracy has for administrative efficiency. It is argued that depending on whether we define administrative efficiency as technical or substantive efficiency (Rutgers/van der Meer 2010), we may find that organizational theorists and political scientists shared a narrow focus on Weber's efficiency thesis. In the final section, we also touch upon the question of how contemporary Public Administration may benefit from this study.

**The Challenges of Selecting, Classifying, and Overviewing a Body of Sources**

To achieve the objective of this study, one has to cope with (at least) three major challenges. First, it is crucial to define what is meant by 'organizational theory approach to Public Administration' as well as to clarify how this approach may be distinguished from the political science approach. Second, a strategy is needed for the selection of a sufficiently comprehensive sample of sources, which promises to mirror the reception of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy within the two approaches. Once an 'organizational' and a 'political' sample of sources has been established, it is important to obtain an overview of where to begin with the qualitative textual analysis. It is argued in the following paragraphs how these challenges may be dealt with (cf. Sager et al. 2011, 10-11).

### The Challenge of Classifying Sources

How is it possible to define the boundary between a political science and an organizational theory approach to Public Administration? Any attempt to classify academic publications into two thematically exclusive approaches is to some degree an arbitrary undertaking which cannot do justice to the diversity of the field of study. Both the political science and the organizational theory approach are in reality permeable and mutually overlapping. However, it is equally problematic to let "a hundred flowers bloom without knowing the family lineage of the flowers" (Yang et al. 2008, 25). One can infer from the analytical dichotomy Gajduschek (2003) uses in examining the American interpretation of Weber's alleged efficiency thesis, that while an external perspective to public administration characterizes the political science approach, the organizational theory approach focuses on the internal functioning of organizations.

More specifically, Gajduschek (2003, 702) contends that organizational theory, organizational behavior and management, as well as organizational sociology are generally concerned with "bureaucracy as an organizational phenomenon as a well-defined group of mutually interrelated persons. According to this approach, certain features of the personnel, the organizational structure, and procedures define bureaucracy as a type of organization, irrespective of the social subsystem in which the organization at hand is present." On the other hand, he writes that political scientists are usually concerned with bureaucracy as a particular mechanism of the whole political system. They are interested in the question of compatibility between bureaucracy and democracy and therefore occupy themselves with "specific features of bureaucracies, which more or less stem from the inherent logic of modern administrative conduct and – at the same time – satisfy the stipulations of modern political processes" (Gajduschek 2003, 706). Among the specific features, he adds that the rule of law, hierarchy, impersonality, and a merit-based personnel-system are typically of greatest interest to political scholars, for they codify the public interest, define the relationship of appointed administrators to elected politicians, ensure citizen equality, and guarantee administrative neutrality, respectively.

### The Challenge of Selecting Sources

As the potential amount of primary sources for the study at hand is overwhelming, a sensible strategy is needed for the selection of a somewhat representative sample

of sources. In order to limit the volume of data, this study exclusively investigates the transfer of Weberian ideas as reflected in widely read American books in the field of public administration. Books are considered American if they have been written by an English-speaking author (including German émigré scholars) and issued by a U.S. publishing house. Moreover, the examination concentrates on books that appeared before 1990. While the advent of the internet during the 1990s made it much easier for students of public administration to seek inspiration in Weber's writings, it has become almost impossible to thoroughly examine these inspirations.

Considering the multidisciplinary nature of U.S. Public Administration (Raadschelders 2010b; Peters/Pierre 2003, 7), it is hard to say which books make up the field as a whole, and it is even harder to determine the most influential books (Stallings/Ferris 1988, 580). This study draws on McCurdy's (1986) bibliographic guide to the administrative literature which provides a rather comprehensive sample of widely read books. All the books in his collection "were identified by cross referencing a series of reading lists, textbook citations, and specialized bibliographies prepared by experts in the field" (McCurdy 1986, iv). This bibliography is complemented with Sherwood's (1990) collection of books. He asked 25 colleagues to "recommend the five or six books that have had the most influence on public administration" (Sherwood 1990, 250).

The sample of sources resulting from these two collections includes a total of 213 items from which it is possible to determine two fairly balanced samples of organizational theory ($N_O = 52$) and political science books ($N_P = 47$). The classification is shown in the Appendix. With due regard to the content of these 99 books, it can be argued that authors either adopt a dominantly external, or a dominantly internal perspective on (public) administration in addressing their research questions. To back up the twofold classification, we additionally consulted the publisher's description and labeling of each selected book (e.g. business/sociology vs. political science). Moreover, considering the explorative and inductive orientation of this study, the categories can be adjusted in the course of the qualitative textual analysis which will follow in the third section of this paper (cf. Werner/Zimmermann 2006, 46).

It should not be concealed that the sample of sources resulting from McCurdy's (1986) and Sherwood's (1990) bibliographies exhibits a bias towards publications from the 1960s. This is probably due to the fact that old books tend to get forgotten and new books need a certain amount of time to become influential. As a solution to

this problem, it would have been possible to search for references to Weber in the *Public Administration Review* (PAR) – the oldest American journal with the broadest interest in the field as a whole. However, assigning articles into either an organizational theory or a political science category would have been even more difficult than classifying the books which have been chosen.

### *Bibliometric Analysis of Influential Books*

While some of the 99 selected books had to be scanned by quick reading, the majority of them contained an author index which made it considerably easier to trace references to Weber. We were able to find references in 47 books from which 57 percent ($N_{OW}$ = 27) belong to organizational theory, and 43 percent to the political science approach ($N_{PW}$ = 20). Table 1 displays the distribution of references to Weber given by decade.

**Table 1**: Distribution of References to Weber by Decade in Influential Organizational and Political Books

| Year | Total of Organizational Book | Weber in Organizational Books | | | | Total of Political Books | Weber in Political Books | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Hits by absolute numbers | | Hits/ Books in Period in % | Hits/ $N_{OW}$ in % | | Hits by absolute numbers | | Hits/ Books in Period in % | Hits/ $N_{PW}$ in % |
| | | Books | Pages | | | | Books | Pages | | |
| 1930-39 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0% | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| 1940-49 | 4 | 2 | 30 | 50% | 7% | 3 | 1 | 1 | 33% | 5% |
| 1950-59 | 11 | 5 | 60 | 45% | 19% | 7 | 5 | 27 | 71% | 25% |
| 1960-69 | 27 | 15 | 170 | 56% | 56% | 23 | 7 | 20 | 30% | 35% |
| 1970-79 | 4 | 3 | 25 | 75% | 11% | 9 | 6 | 33 | 67% | 30% |
| 1980-89 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 100% | 7% | 4 | 1 | 7 | 25% | 5% |
| Total | ($N_O$) 52 | ($N_{OW}$) 27 | 290 | | 100% | ($N_P$) 47 | ($N_{PW}$) 20 | 88 | | 100% |

**Sources**: McCurdy (1986, 75-185); Sherwood (1990, 263-264).

For an example of how to interpret Table 1 consider the shaded fields: In the period

from 1960 to 1969, Weber's name appears at least once in 15 out of 27 organizational theory books. In other words, he is mentioned in 56 percent of the considered books published during this decade. The 15 books constitute 54 percent of the whole sample of 27 publications in the field of organizational theory ($N_{OW}$) that contain references to Weber. In addition, an educated estimation of the total pages containing references to Weber reveals that one can find the terms 'Weber' or 'Weberian' in approximately 170 pages of organizational theory books published between 1960 and 1969. In comparison, Weber's prominence is lower in the political science literature from the same decade. Whereas his name is mentioned in seven out of 23 books (30%), it appears only in approximately 20 pages. The seven books represent 35 percent of the total of 20 political science publications ($N_{PW}$) containing references to Weber.

On the whole, the numbers of both political science and organizational theory books within each decade are too small to allow for an interpretation of a developmental trend of Weber's reception. However, the overall results illustrated in Table 1 suggest that organizational theorists shared a stronger interest in Weber's work than their colleagues from the political science approach. One gains this impression especially when comparing the total numbers of pages of organizational theory and political science books that include references to Weber. From a quantitative perspective, this suggests that Weber's influence on the organizational theory approach was – as stated by Beetham (1985, 2) – paralleled by a relative neglect within political science.

Just because one finds references to Weber in books, one cannot jump to the conclusion that there was 'reception'. Lutz (1984, 191) points to the evident weakness of the method discussed so far, stating "that it cannot distinguish among citations that represent the borrowing of an idea, the adapting of an idea, the approval of an idea, the opposition to an idea, or an appeal to authority." Could it be that Weber's writings exerted a 'small but mighty' influence on scholars who approached Public Administration from a political science perspective? Only qualitative textual analysis can reveal whether specific Weberian ideas are present in an American text and, if they are present, whether they are adopted, modified, or rejected (Sager et al. 2011, 8-10). Accordingly, this paper proceeds by exploring and comparing the use of Weber's writings in the selected books. Before this is done, it will be helpful to reconstruct Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy in the context of his original German writings.

## The Epistemological, Historical, and Sociological Context of the Ideal Type of Bureaucracy

If a major theme in Weber's writings were to be found, one would probably come to think of 'rationality' or, considered from a dynamic perspective, 'rationalization'. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that Weber's concept of rationality and his portrayal of the interplay of historical rationalization processes make his writings easily accessible (Schreurs 2000, 49-62; Kalberg 1980). His often confusing use of the term 'rationality' may be the key reason why his intentions regarding the ideal type of bureaucracy have sparked controversy in administrative literature. Weber (1980, 128) explicitly wrote that bureaucracy was, from an ideal typical point of view, "*Die formal rationalste Form der Herrschaftsausübung.*" But what did he mean by that? And how does one translate that into English? The textual comparison in Table 2 suggests that translations can be tricky when it comes to examining the foreign reception of a certain author.

**Table 2:** Weber on the Formal Rationality of Bureaucracy

| Weber in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* | Parsons' Translation | Gajduschek's Translation |
|---|---|---|
| "Die rein bureaukratische, also: die bureaukratisch-monokratische aktenmäßige Verwaltung ist nach allen Erfahrungen die an Präzision, Stetigkeit, Disziplin, Straffheit und Verlässlichkeit, also: Berechenbarkeit für den Herrn wie für die Interessenten, Intensität und Extensität der Leistung, formal universeller Anwendbarkeit auf alle Aufgaben, rein technisch zum Höchstmaß der Leistung vervollkommenbare, in all diesen Bedeutungen: formal rationalste, Form der Herrschaftsausübung." (Weber 1980, 128) | "Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization – that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy – is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks." (Henderson/Parsons 1997, 337; Roth/Wittich 1978, 223) | "Due to all experiences, the pure bureaucratic, that is, the bureaucratic-monocratic form of administration, based on written files, is, purely technically, capable of reaching the highest level and perfection of performance with respect to its precision, continuity, discipline, stringency, altogether: predictability for its ruler (Lord) as well as for other interested parties and with respect to the qualitative and quantitative aspects of its performance and its formally universal applicability for all tasks. This means that it is the most formally rational form of exercising authority." (Gajduschek 2003, 721) |

**Sources:** Gajduschek (2003, 721); Henderson/Parsons (1997, 337); Weber (1980, 128); Roth/Wittich (1978, 223)

Table 2 illustrates that translations can represent re-interpretations (Rutgers 1996).[2]
In Weber's original writings, one searches in vain for the word *Effizienz*, probably
because it was a foreign term for him (Gajduschek 2003, 710; Derlien 1999, 57).
Parsons' use of the words 'is in this sense' suggests that he drew an equation be-
tween 'formally most rational' and 'the highest degree of efficiency'. Considering the
fact that this general statement introduces the paragraph, one gains the impression
that the remainder of the paragraph was supposed to specify what was meant by
efficiency. It seems that the translator intended to treat the attributes of precision,
stability, stringency, reliability, and calculability as elements of bureaucratic efficien-
cy. Especially the use of the word 'finally' at the end of the list strengthens this im-
pression. It also appears that the aspects of control and predictability were under-
stated in the translation (Gajduschek 2003, 713).

This linguistic confusion may be justification enough for a more detailed discussion
of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. Accordingly, this section attempts to recon-
struct the concept in the context of (1) the general epistemological status of ideal
types, (2) Weber's interpretation of western history as a multifaceted process of
rationalization, and (3) his typology of traditional, charismatic, and legal domination.

### The Epistemological Status of Ideal Types

Weber (1904) felt certain that there was no objectively or metaphysically true mean-
ing in cultural and social processes. Students of such processes were thus on the
wrong track if they believed their research would lead to the discovery of universal
empirical laws. Despite this conviction, he claimed that different social scientists
could come to the same, hence objective, results if their research was based on
sensible causal assumptions and carefully conducted empirical studies. If one
wanted to comprehend human actions and interactions in their infinite complexity,
one was well advised to arrange them into a meaningfully adequate (*sinnadäquat*),
unified analytical construct: the ideal type (Weber 1980, 9-10). The investigator
could then arrive at an interpretative understanding (*deutendes Verstehen*) of a
concrete event by examining the differences between the observed behavior and
the initially constructed yardstick (Raadschelders 2010a, 306; Ringer 1997, 49-51;
110-121).

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[2] If not indicated otherwise, the translations of Weber's writings are our own. It may be interesting to note
here that only a small minority of the 'receiving' authors considered in this paper consulted Weber's original
writings (e.g. Merton 1949; Friedrich 1952).

Weber believed that historical and social research could lead to a value-free out-come, even if the choice and delimitation of a research problem depended on the value judgments of the inquirer. Although the term 'ideal' may suggest so, ideal types were not meant to be "normatively exemplary" (Ringer 2002, 173; cf. Weber 1904, 200). His portrayal of both the emergence and the structural characteristics of bureaucracy were thus not guided by anticipation of a perfect form of social organi-zation (Tyrell 1981, 40). Neither was the ideal type of bureaucracy meant to be empirically exemplary. Even though Weber's experience with the Wilhelminian Reich may have been a source of inspiration, it was not his aim to provide a de-scription of the German administrative apparatus of his time (Treiber 2007, 133; Raadschelders 2000, 114; Derlien 1999, 59-61).

### Western History as a Rationalization Process

Weber (1988, 517) used ideal typical historical stages as means of representation to explore the "origins of western rationality and the reasons for its absence or vari-ations in other cultures" (Swidler 1973, 35). He defined the state as a political cor-porate group (*politischer Anstaltsbetrieb*), whose administrative body successfully claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in executing laws and regulations. This definition applied only to the occidental state in its fully developed form (Weber 1980, 39; 815). Weber pictured "the emergence of the modern state from feudalism as a gradual but irreversible process by which sociopolitical relations have become both institutionalized and impersonalized. […] During the era of abso-lute monarchy, feudalism faded away and was replaced by the modern administra-tive apparatus" (Shaw 1992, 382). The emergence and constant expansion of bu-reaucracy was inevitable, for it was technically superior to any other form of organi-zation. Weber (1980, 570) explicitly wrote that the "fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations precisely as compares a machine with non-mechanical forms of production." The bureaucracy promised an optimum level of "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction, and reduction of material and per-sonal costs" (Weber 1980, 570).

Whereas the emergence and expansion of bureaucracy displayed the rationaliza-tion of the state, the rise of large-scale capitalism reflected economic rationalization. In both these processes, the legal formalization of social norms had served as a catalyst, since both the state and capitalist firms had depended on the predictability

and certainty of the law (Treiber 2007, 131-132). Finally, the rationalization of peo-
ple's political, economic, and legal life-spheres was paralleled by a far-reaching
change of their inner world views (Kalberg 1980, 1150). Especially the Protestant
ethic had been decisive in developing an increasingly conscious wish of man to
control the world – *die Entzauberung der Welt* – which had led to the "elimination of
both magical and spiritual forces from the picture of the world" (Shils 1987, 561; cf.
Weber 1990, 209).[3] In this context, the formalization of the law meant an objectifica-
tion of the domination of people over people.

### Traditional, Charismatic, and Legal Domination

Although Weber thought that several patterns of domination had always existed in
combinations with each other, he "insisted that clear concepts are needed to ana-
lyze such combinations in terms of their legal, traditional or charismatic elements"
(Bendix 1959, 296). Weber (1980, 122) defined domination (*Herrschaft*) as the
chance for orders to find obedience within an assignable group of people. For a
system of domination to be institutionalized it had to "establish and cultivate a belief
in its legitimacy" (Schreurs 2000, 55). From an ideal typical point of view, this belief
could be either rational or irrational. In charismatic and traditional domination, the
motives for obedience were irrational, because the ruler's authority was not con-
sciously brought into question. In charismatic domination, people obeyed their lead-
er because of their belief in the leader's wisdom or magical power. In traditional
domination, people obeyed their master out of personal loyalty or a pious concern
for the master's inherited status (Weber 1980, 124; 1952, 109-114; Bendix 1959,
295).
Weber (1980, 122; 1952, 106) spoke of legal domination if a "system of rules that is
applied judicially and administratively in accordance with ascertainable principles is
valid for all members of the corporate group" (Bendix 1959, 294). In Weber's view, it
was the bureaucracy that represented the purest form of legal domination. Its prin-
ciples read as follows: The different levels of authority are organized hierarchically
into an unambiguous system of super- and subordination. Administrative proce-
dures are based on written rules, an impersonal order, and a clear division of labor.
Not only the appointment of bureaucrats to administrative offices, but also their
advancement within the organizational hierarchy is a result of qualification and

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[3] The phrase *Entzauberung der Welt* can be translated as 'de-magification' or 'disenchantment' of the world
(Kalberg 1980, 1146).

performance rather than ancestry. As specialized professionals, bureaucrats are characterized by an ethos of vocation and their mode of interaction with the public is supposed to be neutral. Finally, their household needs to be separated from their professional enterprise. This is why they are salaried and usually receive a pension (Weber 1980, 124-130; 825-827).

The bureaucrats' motives for obedience were above all value-rational (*wertrational*), since they stemmed from a conscious belief in the intrinsic value of following rules (Treiber 2007, 128; Weber 1980, 12). Instead of obeying a person, they acted upon a legally specified, impersonal, and therefore objective order. In the course of the rationalization of the state, bureaucrats had come to think of laws and regulations as their maxim of conduct. They performed their administrative tasks neutrally and followed their political leaders to the point of self-denial. Weber (1992, 190; 1980, 833) explicitly wrote that "the passionate struggle for power – *ira et studium* – is the politician's element, whereas the bureaucrat should strive to execute legal orders dutifully, without anger and passion – *sine ira et studio.*"

This distinction between politics and administration was meant as an ideal typical distinction (Weber 1952, 107). Therefore, the behavior of bureaucrats could by definition only correspond approximately to empirical reality. Weber did not assume that bureaucrats would always perform their jobs without anger and passion (Beetham 1985, 67). As a contemporary witness of the *Beamtenherrschaft* in the Wilhelminian Reich, Weber must have been aware of the problems which would today be referred to as 'bureaucratic free enterprise' and 'bureaucratic drifting'. He knew that bureaucrats could use their advantage of asymmetric information to put their own issues on the political agenda. He also knew that they could pursue their own interest by establishing administrative practices that would result in policies which were quite far away from the initial legislative intent. Especially in his later political writings, Weber contemplated these negative consequences. As measures to weaken the political influence of bureaucrats he called for strong political leadership and proposed, for example, that the parliament be strengthened, and that the parliamentary selection of political leaders be complemented by plebiscitary election (Overeem 2010; 70-78; Treiber 2007, 138-140; Ringer 2004, 220-224).

The purpose of this section was to provide the background for a deeper understanding of the reception of Weber's concept of bureaucracy as reflected in parts of organizational theory and the political literature of U.S. Public Administration. In what follows, this reception is explored on the basis of a close textual analysis.

## Comparing Weber's Reception in Organizational Theory and the Political Science Approach to Public Administration

Scaff (2011, 198-199 cf. Raadschelders 2010a, 310; Erdelyi 1992, 109-110) identifies three necessary conditions that needed to be met for the dissemination and reception of Weber's work among American social scientists. First, professional networks had to be established which would cultivate and sustain his corpus. The earliest American discussions of Weber's writings took place within professional groups of sociologists and economists, which were formed in the 1920s at Harvard and the University of Chicago. They were eventually followed by other intellectuals who gathered at Columbia and Berkeley, the University of Wisconsin, and the New School for Social Research in New York. As most members of these networks where either German émigrés or scholars who had spent some time in German lecture halls, they were generally quite proficient in German. Second, Weber's texts had to be made available in English. Regarding Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, it is essential to note that various parts of *Economy and Society*, his methodological reflections, and his historical-sociological writings were translated and published by 1950 (Shils/Finch 1949; Henderson/Parsons 1947; Gerth/Mills 1946; Parsons 1930; Knight 1927). Last but not least, Weber's "thought, his research problems, and his conceptual languages" needed to find their way into "curricula, undergraduate courses, and advanced graduate research seminars in American colleges and universities" (Scaff 2011, 198). Not until these preconditions were firmly in place could Weber's portrayal of bureaucracy gain currency in the American social sciences, most notably within the field of organizational research, but to a lesser degree also among political scientists.

The analysis of the sample of books reveals that several organizational theorists[4] and political scientists[5] merely mentioned Weber's work in passing, acknowledging it as a source of their research. In this context, it may be interesting to note that some organizational theorists placed Weber's theory of bureaucracy in the tradition of Taylor (1911), and Gulick and Urwick (1937), and labeled it "gospel of administrative efficiency" (Gross 1964, 120), or "machine theory" (Katz/Kahn 1966, 71; cf. Thompson J. 1967, 71; March/Simon 1958, 36). Somewhat surprisingly, the political scientists mentioned by Rosenbloom (1983) did not draw an explicit parallel be-

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[4] For instance, see Selznick (1949, 210); Pfiffner/Sherwood (1960, 55-58); Herzberg (1966, 34); Argyris/Schön (1978, 324).
[5] For instance, see Meyerson/Banfield (1955, 148); Elazar (1966, 6); Allison (1971, 298).

tween Weber and scientific management, even though they were generally aware of Weber's work.[6]

In what follows, we discuss in how far organizational theorists and political scientists substantively dealt with Weber's work. The discussion proceeds along the lines of the previous section. First, we demonstrate what the considered authors had to say in general about Weber's use of ideal types. Second, we reflect on their reception of Weber's bureaucratization thesis. Third, we illustrate how his sociology of domination was received. The reception in organizational literature is always considered before the reception in political literature, followed by a comparative discussion of the findings.

### The Reception of Weberian Ideal Types in Organizational Literature

Merton (1949, 151-153) drew on Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy to define and illustrate the bold outlines of formal, rational social organizations. Dealing with the relation of bureaucratic structure and human personality, he accused Weber of being "almost exclusively concerned with what the bureaucratic structure attains: precision, reliability, efficiency" (Merton 1949, 154). The dysfunctions of bureaucratic organization and its harmful effects on individual behavior, however, had almost wholly been neglected. Merton (1949, 153-159) argued that bureaucratic structures promoted depersonalized relationships and professional deformations (e.g. trained incapacity, occupational psychoses) among bureaucrats that would inevitably lead to conflicts with the public. It was therefore not surprising, he continued, that Weber's concept of bureaucracy stood in harsh contrast to the opinion of American citizens, to whom almost without exception the term 'bureaucrat' had become "an epithet, a *Schimpfwort*" (Merton 1949, 153; cf. Gouldner 1954, 19). Merton (1949, 159-160) concluded that future organizational studies ought to deal empirically "with the interdependence of social organization and personality formation" and thus reach beyond the Weberian model.

Blau (1956, 34; 1955, 251) and Blau and Scott's (1962, 34) publications provide another example of how organizational theorists reacted to Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. In supposed opposition to Weber, they lamented that no necessary

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[6] Appleby (1952, 141), Dahl/Lindblom (1953, 202, 234), Waldo (1948, 41), Long (1962, 136), and Seidman 1975 [1970], 79, 107) mentioned Weber's writings as a general source or referred to them in order to define bureaucracy. Truman (1951, 262) and Lowi (1969, 53) used Weber's definitions of 'power' and 'government' respectively.

causal relationship exists between formal bureaucratic characteristics and efficiency. Explicitly, Blau and Scott (1962, 34) stated that a "careful reading of Weber indicates that he tends to view elements as 'bureaucratic' to the extent that they contribute to administrative efficiency. This contribution to efficiency appears to be the criterion of 'perfect' embodied in his 'ideal type'." They added that the question of whether or not a combination of bureaucratic elements increased administrative efficiency was not a matter for definition, but a matter for empirical testing. In view of this statement, it may not surprise that Blau's (1956, 35) overall assessment of Weber's method was unequivocal: "Since generalizations about idealized states defy testing in systematic research, they have no place in science."

On the basis of empirical analyses of the daily operations of civil servants, Blau (1956, 1955) aimed to show that a bureaucracy in action functions quite differently from what Weber's abstract portrayal would have us expect. Blau was convinced that normative standards were decisive in explaining the functioning of social organizations. To prove his point, he argued that Weber had been wrong in assuming that bureaucrats would "approach the public in a 'spirit of formalistic impersonality, *Sine ira et studio*, without hatred and passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm'" (Blau 1955, 82). He thought that administrative employees had to be happy, if their operations were to be both effective and efficient. For this aim to be attained, he envisioned a well-balanced interaction of individual initiative and constraining principles as well as the installment of cohesive work groups – aspects that would give bureaucracy a post-Weberian face.

Gross' (1964, 137) understanding of Weberian ideal types was fairly consistent with the interpretation presented in this study: "For Weber, the ideal type concerns the *is* rather that the *should be*. Yet, it is not a description of reality, but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. It offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. As a logically controlled and unambiguous conception, an ideal type is more removed from historical reality than less precise concepts. The task of the researcher is to analyze the distance between them and reality and the extent to which they are found in various combinations." However, Gross doubted the analytical validity of ideal types. He contended, for instance, that the ideal typical construction of an impartial bureaucrat was overly simplistic, since it was not "fed by the entire gamut of human emotions" (Gross 1964, 739). One was better off deserting "the make-believe world of ideal-types" and to conceive of administrative behavior more broadly (Gross 1964, 739). Accordingly, he suggested distinguishing

between several behavioral patterns of organizational employees, such as thinkers and doers, or impersonals, personals, and charismatics. Regarding the latter typology, he pointed out that personals would act "more obviously like human beings" than impersonals (Gross 1964, 402). It thus appears that he considered the personal role to come closer to realistic administrative behavior than the impersonal role Weber had assigned to bureaucrats.

Katz and Kahn (1966, 71) argued that Weber had constructed bureaucracy regardless of human acts "according to a blueprint to achieve a given purpose." They added that Weber's overly simplistic theory had approached bureaucracy exclusively via the internal organizational structure and was therefore unable to "deal adequately with the transactions between an organization and its environment" (Katz/Kahn 1966, 109). In this context, Weber mainly served Kahn and Kahn (1966, 109) as an eye catcher to propagate open-system theory. They were convinced that open-system theory represented a more adequate framework to study organizational development, for it emphasized the organization's constant need to adjust to environmental change.

Vroom (1967) edited a book dealing exclusively with methodological questions of organizational research. In his chapter on comparative studies, Burns (1967, 142-143) argued that the danger of Weber's methodology lay in the temptation to divide the constituent elements of an ideal type into autonomous variables and then to seek for correlations among them. Such an empirical strategy was inappropriate because ideal types represented a "normative extreme of system theorizing, in that the shared value elements which inhere in the parts and maintain the system are, so to speak, maximized" (Burns 1967, 143). If the aim was to establish knowledge about different organizations in different cultural contexts, one had to do more than simply compare quantifiable variables yielded by studies of bureaucracy. Otherwise, Burns (1967, 142) concluded, one ran the risk of creating a sociological man – a man that was "just as unreal and, eventually, just as big an obstruction to theoretical development as the 'economic man' proved to be."

Finally, Perrow (1972) attempted to defend Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy against the key points of criticism that he thought had been raised in organizational literature. He argued that most large organizations were in reality fairly bureaucratic, because the "rational-legal form of bureaucracy" represented the "most efficient form of Administration known" (Perrow 1972, 5). He added that "it may not be, as Weber claimed, that all else is dilettantism; but some of the alternative forms are

clearly very expensive, unstable, short-lived, or rare" (Perrow 1972, 5). If one was to deliver a valid theory of modern organization, one was well served by relying on the "model of bureaucracy drawn up by Weber, extending it in many places but rarely if ever modifying it greatly" (Perrow 1972, 59). Speaking of extending Weber, Perrow (1972, 175) believed that the Weberian approach would gain strength if it were combined with the institutional school of organizational thought. In this context, he argued that Weber had of course been aware that organizations were "deeply root-ed in the social structure." According to Perrow (1972, 189), it had nevertheless been the merit of institutional scholars such as Simon and March to have "detailed, for specific organizations and their recent history, the close interaction of organiza-tions and their environments."

### The Reception of Weberian Ideal Types in Political Literature

In *Political Bureaucracy*, Mainzer (1973, i) wrote that he understood himself as a mediator between the sociology of organization and political science. Summarizing the main lines of criticism which he believed Weber's account of bureaucracy had attracted (Mainzer 1973, 4-6), he recalled that confusion had arisen from Weber's treatment of bureaucracy as an ideal type. He wrote that even though Weber had been explicit about the fact that real organizations could only to some degree be bureaucratic, one could easily arrive at the conclusion that "all large-scale admin-istration must be such as Weber described" (Mainzer 1973, 5). Subsequently, he drew attention to the empirical inadequacy of Weber's ideal-typical bureaucrat. He argued that because of their technical competence, bureaucrats were not as easily controllable by superiors as Weber had believed. He also criticized Weber's under-estimation of the bureaucrat's power in influencing government. If one was aware of these shortcomings, Mainzer (1973, 6) concluded, one could use Weber's concept of bureaucracy as a useful basis to "explore further the nature of modern organiza-tions and a heavily bureaucratized society."

Goodsell (1983) regarded Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as an apt model for the description and analysis of U.S. public administration. From both an organiza-tional and a political perspective, he sought to convince his readership that the U.S. bureaucracy was neither a source of waste nor a threat to the citizen's liberty. He noticed that "making our case for bureaucracy inescapably involves defending the use of Weber's model" (Goodsell 1983, 2). As Goodsell (1983, 2) knew that many students of public administration had attacked Weberian bureaucracy as "unworka-

ble and even immoral in not just one but several principles," he expected his polemic to "step on a number of intellectual toes." He recalled that some of those toes belonged to the feet of political theorists, whose alleged falsifications of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy had been concerned mainly with the dangerous political influence of bureaucrats (Goodsell 1983, 8).

Goodsell (1983, 126) did not dispute that bureaucrats possessed political power. It was beyond doubt that they would often act according to their own political values and thus pursue political aims. By pushing their personal viewpoints, they would often determine public policy. Bureaucrats were furthermore supported or opposed by external political groups and thus engaged "in the political conflict that inevitably envelopes those possessing power" (Goodsell 1983, 126). In this context, Goodsell (1983, 127) pointed out that Weber had been aware of the possibly harmful consequences of an increasing bureaucratization of the state. Being a contemporary of authoritarian Prussia, Goodsell added, Weber must have had good reason to fear the political influence of the bureaucratic corps. In modern America, however, this was a minor problem, for most bureaucratic organizations were in reality surprisingly small – and so was their political power. Besides, Goodsell (1983, 128) claimed that the U.S. bureaucracy was subject to various control mechanisms such as external auditing, judicial appeal, and legislative oversight.

Friedrich (1952, 28) was the first 'real' political scientist to draw attention to Weber's ideal typical method. He stated that the term 'ideal' had been an unfortunate choice, because neither the processes of rationalization and *Entzauberung*, nor the concept of bureaucracy portrayed anything ideal. He insisted that ideal-types could not be both 'types' and 'ideal', since types necessarily derived their "significance from the empirical reality which they typify" (Friedrich 1952, 28). They could thus by definition not be an idealized or mentally constructed entity.

Friedrich (29-31) argued that his own empirical comparison of central administrative bodies in several western countries had revealed two major deviations from Weberian ideal types. The first deviation applied to the notion of rationalization and *Entzauberung* as the processes leading to the bureaucratization of social organizations. This notion was deceptive for it pictured highly complex processes as a simple developmental trend. Neither had the historical past been free of trends contrary to what Weber had envisioned, nor was the process of bureaucratization in reality inextricably linked with the processes of rationalization and *Entzauberung*. The second deviation applied to the normative content of the bureaucratic ideal type.

Friedrich (1952, 30) stated that it had been Weber's intention to offer ideal types as an analytical instrument of a value-free social science. The ideal type of bureaucracy, however, contained several normative elements – validity, acceptance, authority, and legality – in the sense of hypothetical conditions of a fully developed, totally effective and thus desirable organization. Stressing the importance of empirical testing, Friedrich (1952, 31) said that these elements were neither inevitable nor desirable. Instead, they represented empirical manifestations which, depending on the institutional context, may or may not occur and may or may not be desired. In Friedrich's view (1952, 33), any call for a value-free theory of bureaucracy was dangerous, for it left no room to normative issues such as the responsibility of public administration in exercising political power.

Finally, dealing with the peculiarities of American federalism, Grodzins (1966, 274) also doubted the value of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy for contemporary political science. He referred to Weber in order to make clear that the principle of *sine ira ac studio* did not apply to the multifaceted institutional reality of American policy-making. He argued that the pluralistic political life of the federal American system included no "easy mechanism for controlling the political activity of the bureaucrat" (Grodzins 1966, 274). In reality, public officials would often use their political scope of influence to strengthen their own position. At the same time, he argued, they would constantly have to share their political power with peripheral political, economic, and social interest groups (Grodzins 1966, 274). Hence, instead of executing public policies responsibly and impartially, bureaucrats were heavily engaged in pursuing the political interests of a whole range of state and local actors.

### Discussion: Weber's Ideal Type Is neither a Description nor a Prescription

The examples given above suggest that Weberian ideal types were rarely understood for what they were – constructed "yardsticks for comparison to reality" (Raadschelders 2010a, 306). They were more frequently viewed as models "*of* and *for* reality" (Raadschelders 2010a, 306, emphasis added). As a result, the ideal type of bureaucracy was often interpreted as either an empirical *de*scription of a modern form of organization, or a normative *pre*scription for attaining maximum administrative effectiveness or efficiency (Bartels 2009, 466).

Organizational theorists mainly challenged Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy for its empirical inadequacy. This study thus substantiates the findings of Mayntz' (1965; translated and summarized by Raadschelders 2000, 113) who observes that organ-

izational theorists discovered contradictions "in the ideal type through establishing whether the various characteristics of bureaucracy were positively correlated." She also finds that Weber's model was criticized for inadequately describing "reality because of a lack of attention for informal structures and dimensions," and for ignoring "notions about goal-decision processes and relations to the environment" (Raadschelders 2000, 113). More generally, it was lamented that the ideal type of bureaucracy could not account for the individual's involvement with and attachment to the organization. The basic criticism against Weber can thus be summarized with the words of March and Simon (1958, 37): "He is not exceptionally attentive to the character of the human organism."

Seibel (2010, 726) argues that Weber's writings became popular in the U.S., because the notion of a politically neutral, unemotional, and efficient bureaucracy resonated with the "principles of responsible government, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability" (Seibel 2010, 726). By examining only a few books we cannot and do not want to falsify Seibel's finding. The above examination nevertheless suggests that Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, and particularly the principle of *sine ira ac studio*, did not receive a warm welcome in organizational and political literature. Especially the ideal typical dichotomy between impartial bureaucrats and partial politicians was not only conceived as overly simplistic and empirically unsupported, but also as normatively dangerous. It was contended that administrators should be treated as political actors, since they were in reality not subservient 'machines', but rather social human beings with potentially selfish motives. Apart from Goodsell's (1983) and maybe Perrow's (1972) interpretations, the Weberian bureaucrat was generally regarded as a threat to the American political system.

Weber had unambiguously stated that ideal types were meant to be neither empirically nor normatively exemplary. While formulating the ideal type of bureaucracy, Weber was arguably not concerned with informal bureaucratic structures, concurrence of bureaucratic characteristics, bureaucracy's relation to its environment, or the 'real' nature of bureaucrats (Mayntz 1965; translated and summarized by Raadschelders 2000, 113). It thus appears that the findings of the considered authors were largely drawn from an erroneous or selective reading of Weber's texts (cf. Raadschelders 2010a, 306; Bartels 2009, 451; Derlien 1999, 56-57). It is somewhat ironic that several authors applied Weber's method without being conscious thereof. By criticizing Weber's work, they were arguably more or less substantively engaged with finding deviations in actually observed or desired functions

of administration from the ideal typical lines of interpretation initially postulated by Weber. Hence, as recommended by Weber, several organizational theorists and some political scientists seem to have arrived at a deeper understanding of administrative phenomena by means of counterfactual reasoning.

### The Reception of Weber's Bureaucratization Thesis in Organizational Theory

Blau (1956) largely followed Weber in illustrating the conditions that gave rise to modern bureaucracy. He called Weber's rationalization thesis convincing, for without the Protestant "orientation toward ceaseless effort and rational conduct as intrinsic moral values, […] capitalism could not have come into existence, and neither, it should be added, could full-blown bureaucracy have developed, because it too depends on rational discipline" (Blau 1956, 40). He furthermore discussed the ambivalent implications of the expansion of bureaucracy for democratic institutions. On the one hand, he found that bureaucracies posed a threat to the American citizen, since they concentrated "power in the hands of a few men and curtail the freedom of individuals that is essential for democracy" (Blau 1956, 114). In the pluralistic political system of the U.S., democratically organized groups were essential for individuals to influence public opinion. The trend towards the bureaucratization of such groups, however, was leaving citizens increasingly powerless and, as a consequence, politically apathetic. On the other hand, Blau (1956, 114-115) stated that bureaucracies served "important functions in a democratic society that must not be ignored." As bureaucratic jobs were distributed on the basis of merit and competence, under-privileged societal groups such as African-Americans had better chances of being treated fairly. To strike an acceptable balance between the negative and positive consequences of bureaucratization, Blau (1956, 118) called for democratic techniques of controlling bureaucracies.

Thompson (1961) and Gross' (1964) shared an ambivalent attitude towards Weber's bureaucratization thesis. Even though Thompson (1961, 4-5) found that Weber had relied on dubious laws in detecting the spirit of rationalism as the engine of history, he nevertheless came to the conclusion that 'rationalization' was what actually happened in contemporary industrial society. In this society, Thompson (1961, 4) added, the prevalent form of organization looked very much like Weberian bureaucracy. Gross (1964, 37), on the other hand, considered Weber's disenchantment-thesis to be exaggerated, for it ignored the "large amounts of magic or quasi-magic still used in […] modern bureaucracy." Despite this criticism, he largely

agreed with Weber on the historical relationship between the growth of modern capitalism, bureaucratization, and the Protestant ethic.

Etzioni (1964, 107; cf. Simon et al. 1950, 71) argued that while Weber had been right in discovering a correlation between the rise of modern capitalism, bureaucratic organization, and religion, he had been wrong in focusing exclusively on the Protestant faith. In Etzioni's (1964, 108) view, the rationalization of the economy and bureaucracy were related to two broader "normative themes which are found in a number of belief systems." First, he believed that "rational behavior is encouraged by worldliness and discouraged by other-worldliness, since it requires an empirical reference, a reality testing, found only in this world" (Etzioni 1964, 108). Second, rational behavior was influenced by asceticism and the motivation to make long-run rather than short-run investments. Of course, Etzioni (1964, 108) continued, these two normative themes were core values of the Protestant ethic, but "other religious and secular belief systems, though different in substance from Protestantism, have expressed these values too." Hence, he recommended that instead of a particular religion, one should regard these two normative themes as providing the cultural context for the development of rational organizations.

Finally, Denhardt (1981, 62) claimed that the bureaucratization of society was not a "historical inevitability but rather a historical possibility subject to change through human action." He added for consideration that if the Weberian destiny of western societies "has been humanly constructed, it can also be humanly reconstructed" (Denhardt 1981, 70). In his constructivist response to positivistic organizational approaches, Denhardt (1981) found that in exercising authority over its members, modern organizations may have had an impact on the normative convictions of individuals so dominant that they eventually internalized the principles of the organization as their own. Instead of remaining whole personalities exhibiting the whole range of human emotions, individuals may thus have been reduced to being organizational personalities. In that sense, he concluded, the Weberian bureaucratization thesis carried with it the danger of being a self-fulfilling prophecy.

### The Reception of Weber's Bureaucratization Thesis in the Political Science Approach

Even if Waldo (1965) generally appreciated Weber's theory of bureaucracy as an insightful read, he was still convinced that the two generations of administrative scholars following Weber had eventually learned that his explanation of the rise of

bureaucracy could not account for the complex development of American admin-
istration. Waldo (1965, 45) reported that "Weber's conceptualization was erroneous
and inadequate in many respects; that Weber for all of his world-ranging scholar-
ship was too much an Imperial German, whose views were shaped if not warped by
the social structure, philosophies of history, and so forth, of his milieu. We need a
new analysis and synthesis which takes cognizance of another half century of histo-
ry." What was needed was a new science of public administration with less deter-
minism, a science that was able to assess "the implications of moral-ideological
choices rather than assuming that administration (bureaucracy) is a neutral instru-
ment that serves them all equally" (Waldo 1965, 44).

Introducing a collection of articles on the *Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy*,
Altshuler (1968, 3) wrote that Weber's notion of the historic inevitability of bureau-
cratization had led quite a few American administrative scholars to the conclusion
that "liberal democracy was doomed." He then promised that Gouldner's polemic
about the alleged similarities between capitalism and socialism was going to illus-
trate that there was no reason for such pessimism.[7] Gouldner (1968, 6-7) observed
that while sound conventional wisdom had it that socialism was the antithesis of
capitalism, doubtful scholarly wisdom had it that socialism and capitalism were quite
alike. It had been Weber, he continued, who had claimed that "questions of eco-
nomic choice could no longer be treated in isolation from questions of administra-
tion" (Gouldner 1968, 7). Weber's thesis about the inevitability of bureaucratization
had unambiguously stated that instead of the worker, it was the bureaucrat who
was in the ascendant. Capitalism and socialism had thus been placed "under the
same umbrella – bureaucracy – with the important practical result that the problem
of choosing between them loses much of its point" (Gouldner 1968, 7; cf. Wilson
1968, 27).

It appears that the controversy about the alleged similarities between capitalism and
socialism served Gouldner (1968, 8-16) as an ideological peg on which to hang his
argument against the Weberian bureaucratization thesis. For him, too many social
scientists had come to adhere to the deterministic assumption that the bureaucrati-
zation of society was an inevitable consequence of the rationalization of the modern
world. This acceptance had led to bleak pessimism about the chances of American

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[7]It should be noted that Gouldner was a sociologist who dealt mainly with organizational phenomena. In this
contribution, however, which was originally published in the *American Political Science Review*, he clearly
took a perspective external to bureaucratic organizations.

citizens for improving their political standards of life. Using a medical analogy, Gouldner (1968, 16) wrote that "instead of assuming responsibilities as realistic clinicians, striving to further democratic potentialities wherever they can, many social scientists have become morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes." The treatment which Gouldner had in mind to cure the disease of bureaucracy will be discussed later in this section. In this particular essay, however, he merely made an anamnesis without offering a remedy.

Mainzer (1973, 120) was convinced that the American bureaucracy was going to be a "major participant in our governing process, both in formulating and in carrying out policy." He thus appears to have agreed with Weber's bureaucratization thesis. According to Mainzer (1973, 5), Weber had not only praised the superior efficiency of bureaucracy over any other form of organization. He had also asked "what we can do 'to keep a portion of mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life'" (Mainzer 1973, 10). The answer Mainzer (1973, 119) gave to this question was quite optimistic. He was confident that the future bureaucracy was not only going to be controlled by ethically responsible, professionally competent political officials, but also by docile administrative officials. Moreover, he suggested that "the future may lie with more professionalism, improvements in our ways of enforcing the rule of law, continued formal and informal political controls, and a bureaucracy increasingly representative of the whole society" (Mainzer 1973, 121).

Krislov (1974, 25-26) used Weber's bureaucratization thesis to give what he considered a satisfying account of how the notion of representative bureaucracy – an organization in which all societal minorities are represented – had permeated political thought. He recalled that in Weber's theory the history of this notion had been outlined as a gradual development from the ancient form of representation based on hereditary rights to the mediaeval form of representation based on socially independent estates (*Stände*) and finally to the modern form of free representation. During the era of absolutism, he continued, the monarch had tried to strengthen his own position vis-à-vis socially privileged groups by centralizing the legislative and administrative powers. According to Krislov (1974, 25), Weber had been right in attributing to the absolute monarch the role of encouraging legislators to "think of themselves as free from the restrictions of local control and established custom." Somewhat paradoxically, however, the king had thus established a self-conscious rival to whom he eventually had to succumb. This had been the prerequisite for the

establishment of the modern form of free representation which was characteristic
for democracies. It seems that Weber's account of the emergence of bureaucracy
served Krislov merely as a starting point to find the proper relationship between the
bureaucracy and the broader political system. He was interested in the extent to
which the notion of representative bureaucracy was compatible with the typical
administrative values of neutrality and efficiency.

Schumann (1976) doubted the capability of bureaucratic organization to deal with
the future challenges of American society. He exclaimed that "we use the word
bureaucracy to represent the kind of organizational arrangements in which we live.
Generally speaking, that is wrong. What we know to be a bureaucracy – what Max
Weber said it was – was suited for another, former, slower time" (Schumann 1976,
18). He added that for Weber "the decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic
organization" had always been the "purely technical superiority" of bureaucracy
"over any other form of organizations" (Schumann 1976, 56). However, in order for
a culture to support strictly rational organization, one had to develop a correspond-
ing attitude. "Machinelike organization," he claimed, "need machinelike people"
(Schumann 1976, 57). Schumann (1976, 58) revealed himself as quite a psychoan-
alyst when he suggested that the Weberian picture of bureaucracy – "a well-oiled,
huge, intricate machine […] that simply crushes everything in its path" – corre-
sponded to "Weber's father in an idealized form." As the counterforce of bureaucra-
cy, he continued, Weber had seen the realm of politics or, metaphorically speaking,
his beloved mother. Weber's optimistic belief in the politician's altruism, however,
was alien to Americans. Hence, for a citizenship that had good reason to mistrust
both politicians and public officials, all Weber could offer was "a choice of unpalata-
ble alternatives" (Schumann 1976, 58).

### Discussion: About the Adequacy and Desirability of Bureaucratization

It is striking that not only organizational theorists but also political scientists were
interested in Weber's portrayal of the rise of bureaucracy. On the one hand, the
above discussion reveals that Weber's account of the interplay of historical rational-
ization processes was occasionally embraced as a convincing depiction of historical
reality. This may support Roth's (1992) explanation of why Weber's work became
popular in the U.S. Roth (1992, 65) writes that Weber found an echo in American
literature, because his readership believed in the historical connection between
political freedom, Protestantism, and the U.S. as a global power. In a similar vein,

Raadschelders (2010a, 310) explains that Weber's emphasis on the Protestant work ethic corroborated the self-confidence of his American readers. He adds that they preferred to ascribe the prosperity of their nation to hard work, asceticism, and utilitarianism, rather than to the extinction of Native Americans, slavery, or the exploitation of natural resources.

At the same time, the present study may add new insights to Roth's and Raadschelders' interpretations, since Weber's bureaucratization thesis also faced criticism from both political scientists and organizational theorists. It seems that they wanted to have a choice as to whether or not the bureaucratization of modern society was inevitable. Accordingly, Weber's historical analysis was criticized for being overly deterministic. Schumann (1976) and Denhardt (1981) raised an additional thought-provoking point by contending that Weber's narrative may have worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy. They would have us consider that an unquestioned adherence to Weber's bureaucratization-thesis may 'breed' machinelike or unemotional people. Finally, it is sometimes argued that Weber's writings served American intellectuals as a counterweight to socialism (e.g. Erdelyi 1992, 133; Roth 1992, 65). It should have become clear that Gouldner (1968) did not agree with this interpretation.

It has been argued that Weber applied ideal typical historical stages as a means of representation to analyze western history in a comparative and, it should be added, neutral manner. Ideal typically speaking, the rise of the rational bureaucracy was inevitable, for it represented the culmination of the rationalization of the state. From a normative point of view, however, Weber pictured the surpassing rationality of the modern bureaucracy as a specious phenomenon. Hence, it was not Weber's intention to paint a completely realistic picture of the emergence and expansion of bureaucracy. Neither did he want to pave the way towards the attainment of a desirable telos. It thus looks as if Weber's bureaucratization thesis was generally re- or misinterpreted.

### *The Reception of Weber's Sociology of Domination in Organizational Literature*

Simon et al. (1950) discussed the paramount importance of authority in securing organizational teamwork. In alleged contrast to Weber, they understood "authority as a psychological rather than a legal phenomenon" (Simon et al. 1950, 181). They argued that people often accepted other people's suggestion on the basis of their reputation, without actually scrutinizing the content of the suggestions. In other

words, people often trusted their leaders because of their charisma. Here Simon et al. (1950, 192) referred to Weber as the first author who had labeled "charismatic leaders" with an appropriate term. However, they considered it regrettable that Weber's notion of charismatic leadership had exhibited "vague mystical overtones," which was why it could not serve as a reliable starting point for a satisfactory theory of social organization and behavior (Simon et al. 1950, 193).

Gouldner (1954, 19; cf. 1952, 48-51) attempted to examine the "obscurities in Weber's work which, if clarified, may enable it to be put to better use." He argued that an improved study of bureaucracy ought to make an explicit distinction between two different manners of exerting authority, something that Weber had failed to accomplish. On the one hand, he recalled that Weber had expected the expert bureaucrat to always act in accordance with a certain rule, for it was considered the best known method of achieving a pre-established goal. On the other hand, Weber had assumed that a subordinate would obey an order merely because of the position occupied by the superior, without examining the actual content of the order. The following citation suggests how dangerous this aspect of machine-like discipline appeared to Gouldner (1954, 23): "The Nazi guards in concentration camps justified their unspeakable atrocities because, as they said, 'We were given orders'." Such observations led Gouldner to the conclusion that instead of giving an account of one type of bureaucracy, Weber had implicitly been describing two forms of bureaucratic organization – the punishment-centered and the representative form.

From a normative perspective, Gouldner favored the latter form. As the term 'representative' suggests, he considered consensual relationships between superiors and subordinates to be of paramount importance for the legitimacy of an organization. According to Gouldner (1954, 222), Weber had forgotten to draw attention to the fact that within any organization, subordinates were more likely to obey orders if they believed their obedience to be consistent with their own aims and values. Gouldner insisted that bureaucratic measures would not be implemented if they were inconsistent with the belief systems of the employees. From this possibility of resistance, it followed that the inevitable bureaucratization of the world was by no means inevitable. Instead, Gouldner (1954, 237) concluded, "The degree of bureaucratization is a function of human striving; it is the outcome of a contest between those who want it and those who do not."

Similarly to what Gouldner had found, Etzioni (1964, 50-51; 1961, 81) saw two Weberian ways of enforcing bureaucratic rules efficiently and effectively. On the

one hand, authority could be exercised by rewarding those who follow the rules and penalizing those who do not. This, however, had the major constraint of keeping the subjects alienated. On the other hand, Etzioni (1964, 51) continued, power could be exercised when the rules were conform to "the values to which the subjects are committed." In this case, the subjects would internalize the rules and would there-fore experience their discipline to be less alienating. The limitation of this way of exercising power was that bureaucrats were "mortals" who often acted emotionally (Etzioni 1964, 55). As the strictly rational rules to be obeyed frequently conflicted with the personal convictions of bureaucrats, bureaucracies tended to "break either in the charismatic or the traditional direction where discipline relations are less sep-arated from other, more 'natural', 'warmer' ones" (Etzioni 1964, 53). Etzioni (1961, 207) thought that the charismatic qualities of organizational heads were essential in increasing the job-satisfaction of bureaucrats, for they helped to "maintain the emo-tional (and in this sense, non-rational) commitment to rationality." In this context, he criticized Weber for assuming that charismatic leadership was limited to the highest echelons of an organization. Considering Etzioni's (1964, 57) profession, it may not surprise that one of his examples stated that university professors were lower-ranking leaders who sometimes exhibited "a great deal of personal charisma."

One can find another comparable argumentation in a book written from a psycho-logical perspective (Schein 1965). Illustrating the notion of the psychological con-tract between an organization and its workers, Schein (1965, 12-15) referred to Weber's notion of legal domination. For Schein (1965, 12), the idea of the psycho-logical contract implied "that the individual has a variety of expectations of the or-ganization and that the organization has a variety of expectations to him. These expectations not only cover how much work is to be performed for how much pay, but also involve the whole patterns of rights, privileges, and obligations between worker and organization." The psychological contract was usually implemented through the authority of an organization a worker had to accept in order to be em-ployed. In contrast to a pure power relationship between superiors and subordi-nates, he argued, an authority relationship was necessarily grounded on a "shared consensus concerning the basis of the legitimacy of the authority" (Schein 1965, 13). Schein (1965, 15) claimed that Weber had overlooked an important source of authority, namely "the acceptance of anyone who has expert knowledge relating to some goal we are trying to achieve, regardless of his position." He considered it a difficult organizational dilemma that subordinates often doubted their superiors'

expertise in fulfilling the requirements of their position (cf. Thompson 1961, 6). Therefore, the organization would fail to meet the worker's expectations and thus violate the psychological contract. To solve this dilemma, Schein (1965, 15) insisted that organizational research must reach beyond the Weberian approach and include "the management patterns that create loyalty and commitment as opposed to alienation and disaffection."

Katz and Kahn (1966, 203-208) were not quite as skeptical about the empirical accuracy of legal domination as Schein. In their description of the most effective form of exercising authority, they largely concurred with Weber's legal-rational type. They recalled that in the hierarchical organization, the ability to exercise power increased with each successive level of the pyramid and culminated in an almost omnipotent highest echelon (Katz/Kahn 1966, 211). Not only could the highest officials steer the actual operation of the organization (executive power), but also determine its staff size and its future policy (legislative power). If an organization had to fulfill simple tasks, if the speed of its performance was essential, and if the surrounding conditions of the organization were stable, the pyramid structure was usually the most efficient and thus widely accepted arrangement of offices. If, however, an organization was to operate under diametrically opposed conditions, the hierarchical model had serious deficiencies. In this respect, Katz and Kahn (1966, 212-215) called the concept of legal-rational authority into question and proposed a democratic alternative. While the executive power of such an organization could still be distributed along the lines of the pyramidal authority structure, the legislative power had to be distributed equally among all members of the organization.

Finally, Dibble's (1965) contribution to the *Handbook of Organizations* (1965)[8] treated a subject that had generally been ignored by organizational scholars – the ideal type of traditional domination. Even though he also viewed bureaucratic or charismatic authority to be much more characteristic of 20th century organizations than traditional authority, he was convinced that especially in academic university departments and in local political parties, organizational relationships based on traditional authority were more the rule than the exception (Dibble 1965, 906). He believed that the concept of traditional authority would not have "fallen by the way-

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[8]As March (1965, xii), the editor of this manual, considered Weber's work among the most influential classics of organization theory, it is hardly surprising that several contributors to the handbook called attention to Weber's sociology of domination (Cressey, 1965, 1036; Feldman/Kanter 1965, 636; Haberstroh 1965, 1201; Peabody/Rourke 1965, 814). As these contributions add little new to the present analysis, it seems appropriate to refrain from a discussion of the points raised by these authors.

side," if Weber had not subsumed "a wide variety of types under a single, inappropriate name" and if he had not "assumed that types of legitimation are highly correlated with types of social structure" (Dibble 1965, 906). In the future, Dibble concluded, traditional authority had to become a vigorous subject of organizational research, precisely because it occurred rarely. He argued that "we will never learn anything about the ways in which organizations affect the societies in which they exist unless we study many kinds, including organizations that are quite different from those which are most characteristic of contemporary life" (Dibble 1965, 908).

### Discussion: About the Antagonism between Bureaucracy and Authority

Against the background of the sources used in this study, it appears that political scientists were not interested in Weber's sociology of domination. In contrast, organizational theorists conceived of Weber's *Herrschaftssoziologie* as a rich but controversial source of inspiration. Most notably, the purest form of legal domination – the ideal type of bureaucracy – was criticized for not appreciating "the possible antagonism between administration and authority" (Mayntz 1965; translated by Raadschelders 2000, 113). In other words, organizational theorists claimed once more that the Weberian concept of bureaucracy did not adequately mirror reality. More specifically, it was lamented that Weber had neglected the possible imbalance between the formal authority of organizational superiors, on one hand, and the expertise and/or values of subordinates on the other. It was also argued that Weber had underestimated the importance of charismatic and, to a lesser degree, traditional patterns of domination in modern organizations.

It must be repeated that the ideal type of bureaucracy as the purest form of legal domination was not an empirical model. Instead, Weber formulated the three ideal types of legitimate domination as a means of comparing different degrees of (ir)rationality in different administrative systems. It was above all the ability of bureaucratic procedures to increase predictability on the part of the ruler, the bureaucratic staff, and the citizen that made bureaucracy more rational than any other system of exercising domination (Gajduschek 2003, 714-715; Derlien 1999, 62). From the ruler's point of view, bureaucratic domination represented the highest possible chance that his or her will was executed according to initially formulated laws and regulations, because the very existence of the executors – the bureaucrats – depended on the regular salary and pension system of the bureaucratic system. From the perspective of the bureaucratic staff, then, the system of univer-

sally applied rules and regulations promised to eliminate arbitrariness in their superiors' exercise of authority. Finally, from the perspective of the citizen, the bureaucratic form of domination promised a "historically unique amount of predictability on the basis of the state as a *Rechts- und Gesetzstaat*" (Derlien 1999, 62).

In this sense, the formal rationality of bureaucratic domination was related to purpose rational (*zweckrational*) action, which stemmed from the conscious consideration of ends, means, and side-consequences and finds its motivation in the prospect of success (Weber 1980, 12). For the ruler, the bureaucratic employee, and the citizen, ideal typical bureaucracy promised to be a successful in organizing domination. Weber was thus able to give an ideal-typical answer to the question of how bureaucracy and individual freedom were compatible. He did not "regard administration and authority as antagonistic forces but as principles existing at the same time in a tense relationship" (Mayntz 1965, translated by Raadschelders 2000, 113). It once more appears that organizational theorists had an incomplete understanding of Weber's writings. Table 3 summarizes the points raised thus far.

**Table 3**: Summary Comparison of the Reception of Weber's Account of Bureaucracy in the Organizational and the Political Approach to U.S. Public Administration

| Reception | Organizational Approach | Political Approach |
|---|---|---|
| **+** | - Appeal to authority<br>- Bureaucratization thesis is empirically adequate<br>- Ideal type is analytically useful<br>- Bureaucracy is an efficient and desirable form of organization | - Bureaucratization thesis is empirically adequate<br>- Bureaucracy is an appropriate and desirable form of organizing and executing public affairs |
| **–** | - Empirical inaccuracy of/disregard for<br>…the human personality<br>…the partiality of organizational personnel<br>…interpersonal relations<br>…the impact of the organization on employees and vice versa<br>…the impact of the environment on organizations<br>…the importance of charismatic leadership in organizations<br>…the conflict between expertise and formal authority<br>- Ideal type is analytically useless<br>- Bureaucratization thesis is empirically inadequate<br>- Bureaucratization thesis works as a self-fulfilling prophecy<br>- Heavy emphasis on administrative efficiency | - Ideal types are normatively dangerous<br>- Impartiality of the bureaucracy is unrealistic<br>- Bureaucratization thesis is empirically inadequate<br>- Heavy emphasis on administrative efficiency (as a value) |

The remaining question is how narrow the focus of both organizational theorists and political scientists was on Weber's so-called efficiency thesis. The concluding section attempts to address this question by drawing together the findings of this section and reflecting on the implications of Weberian bureaucracy for administrative efficiency.

## What Would Weber Say About the Technical and Substantive Efficiency of Bureaucracy?

On the one hand, this paper has attempted to find evidence for a substantial reception of Weber's account of bureaucracy within the political science approach to U.S. Public Administration. It has been illustrated that Weber's work received considerably less attention in political than in organizational literature. As we first searched for references to Weber in American books and then analyzed these references in the context of the content of the books, we are not able to say whether Weber's work had an indirect impact on scholars who approached administrative questions from a political science perspective. It should not be concealed that Weber may have exerted a profound "second-hand" influence on American political scientists via the writings of other authors (Beetham 1985, 2). What we have found is that political scientists were interested in Weber's notion of the rise of bureaucracy and, to a lesser degree, his ideal typical method. It also appears that in contrast to their colleagues from the organizational field of study, political scientists have not concerned themselves with Weber's sociology of domination.

On the other hand, we have asked whether the textual analysis of political literature shows a narrower focus on Weber's so-called efficiency thesis than what is evident in organizational literature. It appears that Weber was much more frequently accused (and occasionally praised) by organizational theorists than by political scientists for having hailed the superior efficiency of bureaucracy over any other form of organization. In fact, *explicit* references to Weber as an advocate of administrative efficiency can almost exclusively be found in organizational publications. In this context, it is essential to draw attention to another limitation of our study. It has been stated that several political scientists merely drew a definitional equation between Weber and bureaucracy without further discussing Weber's work. It may thus be that they *implicitly* reproached Weber by contesting the efficiency of bureaucratic procedures.

Have all the authors, who interpreted Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as a blueprint for administrative efficiency, been victims of a misunderstanding? The answer to this question depends on how we define efficiency – something that the considered authors rarely did. Even if Weber did not use the term *Effizienz* at all, he may have meant 'efficiency' when he talked of formal rationality. Rutgers and van der Meer (2010, 758) explain that administrative scholars normally use the word 'efficiency' in the sense of technical efficiency, describing a ratio between (low) input and (high) output. In Weberian terms, bureaucracy not only promises to decrease the temporal and financial expenses of administration, it also holds out the prospect of a high quantitative and qualitative level of administrative performance. Hence, ideal typical bureaucracy has indeed to do with technical efficiency. The bureaucratic organization of government furthermore promises that laws and regulations are administered with the utmost possible stability, reliability, calculability, unambiguity, discipline, and stringency (Weber 1980, 128, 570). These characteristics have less to do with technical efficiency than with the ability to reduce uncertainty (Gajduschek's 2003, 714-715; Derlien 1999, 62). Nevertheless, as formal rationality refers to both uncertainty reduction *and* technical efficiency, it is not completely inappropriate to find elements of technical efficiency in Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. It should not be forgotten, however, that he never claimed "that bureaucracy was efficient as such, merely that it was more efficient in comparison to other types of rulership" (Raadschelders 2010a, 306).

Moreover, Rutgers and van der Meer (2010) draw a distinction between technical efficiency and substantive efficiency. Instead of describing a ratio between input and output, substantive efficiency is "linked with desired outcomes, that is, the purposes or end for which action is undertaken" (Rutgers/van der Meer 2010, 760). In that sense, efficiency is closely related to what would today be referred to as effectiveness. The difference between the two concepts is that substantive efficiency refers to the action leading to a desired result, while effectiveness refers to the result itself. In other words, substantively efficient actions lead to an effective outcome. Tracing the historical origins of the concept of substantive efficiency, Rutgers and van der Meer (2010, 766) discover that it was sometimes "applied to persons or a body of persons rather than to processes or organizations." For example, substantive efficiency was related to the character, expertise, and experience of administrators. Those who contributed the most to attaining a desired result would have been credited by their contemporaries with being the most efficient administrators.

In agreement with Rutgers and van der Meer (2010, 763), we observe that such a notion of efficiency is "not entirely lost in present-day discourse." Indeed, the "substantive sense of efficiency as a force is still preserved in expressions such as 'an efficient administrator' and 'an efficient organization'" (Rutgers/van der Meer 2010, 772).

We may also find that the notion of substantive efficiency is not entirely lost in Weber's work. Considering his skepticism towards the bureaucratic corps, he would obviously not have used the words 'desired result'. From an ideal typical point of view, however, he would have argued that bureaucracy was a substantively efficient means of producing an effective outcome, the latter being a predictive and non-arbitrary administration. Applying the concept of substantive efficiency to the administrative staff, he would have said that well-educated, experienced, and impartial bureaucrats contributed much to making bureaucracy work. Within the literature considered in this study, Weber's concept of bureaucracy was not only interpreted as a prescription for technically efficient administration, but also – and maybe more importantly – for effective administration. Only if we conceive of administrative efficiency as substantive efficiency may we conclude that both organizational *and* political scholars interpreted Weber as a promoter of bureaucracy as an efficient means of administering government, and the bureaucrat as an efficient administrator. In a nutshell, it appears that the focus of American authors on the relation between Weberian bureaucracy and efficiency has led to creative misinterpretations or, to put it less pejoratively, innovative reinterpretations (Roth 2002, 509; cf. Scaff 2004, 124). Arguably, these reinterpretations have contributed to a deeper understanding of the inherent characteristics of organizations and the political influence of public administration.

More recently, several scholars of Public Administration called for a rediscovery of Weberian bureaucracy (e.g. Peters 2010; Olsen 2006; Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004). Lynn (2008, 29), for instance, explains that "contemporary critiques of traditional government in both America and Germany are based on serious distortions and misunderstandings of the rationale and the dynamics of its creation. This misunderstanding concerns how and why governing institutions evolved, the essential path dependence of national institutional development, and the purposes bureaucracy has and continues to serve on behalf of liberal democracy." The thorough examination of Weber's interpretation of the rise of bureaucracy and his reflections on the basic compatibility of bureaucracy with democracy may provide access to a deeper un-

derstanding of the dynamics and the functions of bureaucracy in different cultural contexts. Even if we consider Weber's answers to these questions outdated, we may still discover that his questions are thought-provoking.

Those who do not want to study Weber's often confusing writings may want to pay attention to the historical reception of his work. This may help to avoid making the same mistakes again: His ideal typical understanding of both the rise and the functions of bureaucracy does neither represent an empirical *de*scription of how to understand the development of governmental institutions, nor a *pre*scription for how to choose the appropriate configuration of current public administration. As comparative yardsticks, Weberian ideal types may still be helpful in understanding the dynamics of public administration in different contexts and the purposes administrative institutions serve in contemporary society.

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Weber Reloaded: How Was Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy Received in the
Organizational and the Political Approach to U.S. Public Administration?

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## Appendix

Classification of Influential Books (N = 99) (The approximate page numbers which contain references to Weber are indicated in brackets.

| 'Organizational' Books (N = 52) | 'Political Science' Books (N = 47) |
|---|---|
| Anthony, Robert N. (1965). *Planning and Control Systems*. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. (0) | Allison, Graham T. (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. (2) |
| Argyris, Chris (1962). *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin Inc. (0) | Altshuler, Alan A. (1968). *The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy*. New York: Dodd, Mean & Co. (10) |
| Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schön (1978). *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*. Reading: Addison-Wesley. (4) | Anderson, James E. (1975). *Public Policy-Making*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. (0) |
| Barnard, Chester I. (1938). *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (0) | Anton, Thomas J. (1966). *The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. (0) |
| Bernstein, Marver H. (1955). *Regulating Business by Independent Commission*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (0) | Appleby, Paul H. (1945). *Big Democracy*. New York: Alfred Knopf. (0) |
| Blau, Peter M. (1955). *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (15) | Appleby, Paul H. (1949). *Policy and Administration*. University: University of Alabama Press. (0) |
| Blau, Peter M. (1956). *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*. New York: Random House. (20) | Appleby, Paul H. (1952). *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. (1) |
| Blau, Peter M. and W. Richard Scott (1962). *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach*. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co. (20) | Corson, John J. and Paul R. Shale (1966). *Men near the Top*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (0) |
| Burnham, James (1941). *The Managerial Revolution*. Westport: Greenwood Press. (0) | Dahl, Robert A. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in and American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press. (0) |
| Cleveland, Harlan (1972). *The Future Executive*. New York: Harper & Sons. (0) | Dahl, Robert A. and Charles E. Lindblom (1953). *Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Political Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes*. New York: Harper & Bros. (3) |
| Cyert, Richard and James G. March (1963). *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (1) | Elazar, Daniel J. (1966). *American Federalism: A View from the States*. New York: Thomas J. Crowell Co. (1) |
| Denhardt, Robert (1981). *In the Shadow of Organization*. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas. (4) | Goodsell, Charles T. (1983). *The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic*. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers. (7) |
| Etzioni, Amitai (1961). *Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates*. New York: Free Press. (20) | Grodzins, Morton (1966). *The American System*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. (1) |
| Etzioni, Amitai (1964). *Modern Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (15) | Harris, Joseph P. (1964). *Congressional Control of Administration*. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution. (0) |
| Gouldner, Alvin (1954). *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. New York: Free Press. (17) | Heclo, Hugh A. (1977). *A Government of Strangers*. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution. (0) |
| Gross, Bertram M. (1964). *The Managing of Organizations: The Administrative Struggle*, 2. Vols. New York: Free Press. (20) | Heller, Walter W. (1967). *New Dimensions of Political Economy*. New York: Norton & Co. (0) |
| Hawley, Willis D. and David Rogers (eds.) (1974). *Improving the Quality of Urban Management*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. (1) | Herring, E. Pendelton (1936). *Public Administration and the Public Interest*. New York: McGraw-Hill. (0) |
| Herzberg, Frederick (1966). *Work and the Nature of Man*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. (2) | Jacob, Herbert and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.) (1965). *Politics in the American States*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (0) |
| Herzberg, Frederick, Mausner Bernard and Barbara Snyderman (1959). *The Motivation to Work*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. (0) | Krislov, Samuel (1974). *Representative Bureau-* |
| Kahn, Robert L. (1964). *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity*. New York: | |

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